


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Deng Xiaoping Speaks in Defense of Nuclear Test
HK0507065392 Hong Kong *CHENG MING* in Chinese
No 177, 1 Jul 92 pp 28-29

[Article by Ling Hsueh-Chun (0407 7185 0689): "Deng Xiaoping Speaks in Defense of Nuclear Explosion"]

[Excerpt] According to communist China's high-ranking military personnel, the nuclear test conducted in Xinjiang's Lop Nor was the most powerful underground nuclear explosion in the history of the military.

It is said that each of the two nuclear tests in Xinjiang's Lop Nor on 21 May was equivalent in power to 600,000 tons of TNT, and that that was a new nuclear technology. The nuclear test project was codenamed "2-Summer 92."

Underground Nuclear Explosion Codenamed "2-Summer 92"

On the day of the nuclear explosion, Ding Henggao, director of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense [CSTIND], announced at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission [CMC]: In terms of level, the nuclear explosion "symbolizes that our country's nuclear technology has reached the late 1980's technical competence of the United States and the Soviet Union."

Celebration Amidst International Censoring

That day, organizations including the General Staff Department, General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department of the People's Liberation Army [PLA], the CSTIND, and the Second Artillery Corps sent messages of congratulation. CMC First Vice Chairman Yang Shangkun also called with congratulations on the success of the nuclear explosion.

On 25 May, the CMC awarded certificates of commendation signed by Jiang Zemin. It also credited relevant personnel participating in the nuclear explosion with the special merit, first-grade merit, second-grade merit, and gave special awards to relevant collectives, and first-grade awards, second-grade awards, and third-grade awards to individuals.

It has been learned that members of the leading group responsible for the new-technology nuclear explosion on 21 May include Chi Haotian, Ding Henggao, and Li Xuge.

The nuclear explosion drew the attention of and was censored by some countries. They stated that they could not understand the objective of the CPC's nuclear test at this time and wondered why China conducted the powerful nuclear test especially at a time when the cold war had ended, when international tension was tending to relax, and when various powers were reducing their nuclear weapons.

Deng Xiaoping: We Must Not Spare Money on That

At the "21 May" CMC meeting, Chief of General Staff Chi Haotian relayed a recent speech given by Deng Xiaoping to persons in charge of the CMC. Deng Xiaoping said: "Everybody knows that we must not spare money on that (referring to the nuclear test). If we do not possess advanced nuclear technology, we will be bullied and oppressed. Our position and hope are that nuclear weapons will be totally banned and destroyed at an earliest possible date. If others are not willing to do so, then we can do nothing. However, we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor will we export nuclear weapons. This is our position and policy, which makes a lot of sense wherever it is stated. Why are countries possessing vast quantities of advanced nuclear weapons not willing to publicly state that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and yet are opposed to the limited nuclear tests by other countries? Is this not overbearing? Is this practice okay in the rapidly approaching 21st century?"

Deng Xiaoping's remarks have exhibited CPC leaders' special character of getting their own way and not hesitating to separate themselves from the international community.

According to the military, the CPC conducted in Xinjiang's Lop Nor a strategic test of nuclear weapons with power equivalent to 500 to 1,000 tons of TNT and that can destroy formations of operating tanks within an area of 35 to 40 km. [passage omitted]

Cheney Orders Missile Defense System by 1997

OW0307053892 Beijing *XINHUA* in English
0504 GMT 3 Jul 92

[Text] Washington, July 2 (XINHUA)—U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said today he had ordered to prepare a rudimentary system of defending against long-range missile attack by 1997.

In a letter to Sen. Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Cheney said he had ordered the Defense Department to implement the anti-missile plan as a "top national priority."

"The threat to the U.S. homeland from accidental or unauthorized launch is present today," Cheney said in apparent reference to nuclear weapons in the former Soviet republics.

And future missile threats may also come from Third World nations, he said.

"That is why it is absolutely urgent that we develop a system of defense against ballistic missiles before we are threatened by those missiles," Cheney said.

Development of the system, which is being conducted by the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) organization in the Pentagon, is a vastly scaled-back version of the missile

defense system, envisioned by then-President Ronald Reagan in 1983 when he created the SDI.

Cheney said he had directed the Defense Department to be prepared to have available by 1997 an anti-missile system of interceptors, radars and battle management computers, although the interceptors would not be fully tested by then.

It is realistic to expect a rudimentary system could be ready by 1997, Cheney said, but allowing for "schedule slips" that are common in complex defense projects, a "more likely" date was 1998.

At the same time, Cheney said it was unclear whether the system would comply fully with the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Henry Cooper, the director of the SDI, told reporters that the new plan calls for preparing an initial anti-missile site—either near Grand Forks, North Dakota, or somewhere in the northeast—as early as 1997 but possibly not until 1999.

The initial site would be followed by construction of at least three others in the continental United States—in the northwest, the southeast and the southwest—plus sites in Hawaii and Alaska.

Each site would have ground-based interceptor rockets designed to fly into outer space to destroy hostile missiles.

Cooper said a decision on when to make the first site "active" would not be made until at least 1995.

The first site would cost 16 billion dollars to 18 billion dollars, he said. The full system, with multiple sites and a constellation of mini-satellites to help guide the interceptors, would cost 35 billion dollars.

Cooper also said the first anti-missile site initially would have just 12 missile interceptors and they would not be fully tested. They would be prototypes, or models.

'Authoritative' Military Sources on Disarmament

*HK0707083592 Hong Kong MING PAO in Chinese
7 Jul 92 p 58*

[“Special dispatch”: “Military To Cut Troops by Only 300,000; Seven Military Regions, Three Major Fleets To Remain Unchanged”]

[Text] According to authoritative military sources in China, the rumor about China's plan to reduce the number of major military regions and cut down on the size of the three major fleets was “untrue.” The structure of seven military regions “will absolutely not” be changed in the near future. The number of troops to be demobilized will not be as many as 500,000, as reported in the outside world. The accurate figure is 300,000.

It was reported earlier that the CPC Central Military Commission decided to gradually disband the seven

military regions in order to strengthen the unified leadership over the armed forces. As the first step, the number of military regions will be reduced to four, and Jinan Military Region would be first among them. In the Navy, the three fleets—namely, the North China Sea Fleet, the East China Sea Fleet, and the South China Sea Fleet—would be disbanded. In the future, the group armies of the ground force and the naval bases would be directly commanded by the Central Military Commission. According to military sources, the above-mentioned report was “inaccurate.”

According to the sources, the military reform program formulated by the Central Military Commission still “took minor steps.” In order to be prudent and safe, apart from merging the Signal Corps Department, the Antichemical Weapon Department, the Armored Forces Department, the Engineering Corps Department, and the Artillery Department of the General Staff Headquarters into a “Special Armed Forces Department,” no other major adjustment of the military structure would be made. Therefore, the seven military regions and the three fleets would all be maintained.

Reportedly, the reform of the Chinese armed forces is still oriented to the enhancement of the quality. However, in view of the stability of the armed forces and the job placement pressure that would be brought to the civilian institutions after the large-scale disarmament, this year, the number of troops to be demobilized will not exceed 300,000, as opposed to the figure of 500,000 reported by some outsiders.

In this round of disarmament, the personnel in the organs of the general departments and in the military academies will be reduced, but the field armies will not be weakened; instead, they will be reinforced. For example, the number of rapid reaction troops subordinate to various military regions will be increased from 10,000 at present to 50,000. In addition, the number of marines and airborne troops will also be increased. This shows that China's military strategy has been changed from the previous “people's war” principle into a strategy stressing the needs in limited wars and local conflicts.

Military regions are the first-level military organizations set up by the CPC after the founding of the PRC according to the division of strategic regions. They are directly commanded by the Central Military Commission. Each military region has a command headquarters, a political department, and a logistics department, and commands several field group armies, provincial districts, and military academies. In more than 40 years, military regions were adjusted several times. Before 1955, there were six military regions, namely, the Northwest, Southwest, East China, Central-South, North China, and Northeast Military Regions. Afterward, the military regions increased to 12—the Shenyang, Beijing, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, Kunming, Lanzhou, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet Military Regions. In 1956, the Fuzhou Military Region

was added to the structure. Several years later, the Inner Mongolia and Tibet Military Regions were downgraded to provincial districts, and the number of military regions was decreased to 11. After 1985, the military regions were merged into the present seven.

'Roundup' Examines New CSCE Role for Europe
*OW0807223992 Beijing XINHUA in English
2158 GMT 8 Jul 92*

[“Roundup” by Yang Yuanhua: “CSCE To Become a Guarantor of Security in Europe”]

[Text] Brussels, July 8 (XINHUA)—With one day to go before the summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) begins in Helsinki Thursday, the participating countries have been close to agreement on a “Helsinki 1992 Document” to be adopted at the summit.

The summit blueprint aims at transforming CSCE from a forum for East-West detente to a primary guarantor of stability and security in Europe.

A draft of the document contains plans for a security forum to oversee new arms control talks, and for the CSCE to become involved in peacekeeping operations.

On security, a permanent CSCE forum for security is expected to be created. It will begin operating this autumn and examine in particular issues linked to arms control.

On the other hand, the summit will probably not decide to adopt a real binding security treaty, as had been proposed by France at the ministerial meeting of the CSCE at the end of January, but would limit itself to approving a code of conduct for its members.

The summit is expected to make the CSCE a regional agreement under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. This would enable it to contribute to the settlement of conflicts. Diplomats said that the summit would reach agreement on the creation of a CSCE “troika” modeled after the European Community’s “troika.”

The role of the NATO in peacekeeping had proved one of the most vexing issues, but the United States welcomed the deal’s outcome. “we are satisfied,” American Ambassador to CSCE John Kornblum said.

The dispute pitted the United States against France over what amounted to future U.S. influence in Europe.

The deal gave the United States, through NATO involvement in CSCE peacekeeping operations, the influence it was seeking, but also carefully constrained NATO’s role. Other organizations or states besides NATO can participate in the operations, and NATO will not be allowed to take them over.

Analysts here believe the draft document has failed to map out how CSCE structures should be reinforced in the future.

Another question waiting to be solved is the creation of a CSCE court of arbitration proposed by Germany, which arouses perplexity, particularly among the American and British delegations.

The CSCE decided Wednesday that no representative of Yugoslavia would be present at the CSCE summit in Helsinki or any subsequent meetings of the CSCE until October 14 1992, but Yugoslavia has announced that it will boycott the Helsinki summit.

Another summit is scheduled in Budapest for 1994.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

CSCE General Committee Issues Security Report

LD0607117092 Budapest MTI in English 2021 GMT
5 Jul 92

[Text] Budapest, July 5 (MTI)—Excerpts from the report of the General Committee on Security of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

The military dimension of security has lost its relevance. Nations will continue to retain armed forces and these forces will continue to fulfill their traditional role of protection and insurance. However, they will also increasingly contribute to crisis management and conflict resolution through peacekeeping and other roles in accordance with international agreements. Whatever the roles and missions of military forces, their existence will be an important element in developing a more stable and secure Europe. Therefore, it will be essential to ensure that the doctrines, structures and deployments of these forces provide reassurance rather than suspicion, and thus contribute to rather than undermine stability. This will be best achieved by increasing dialogue, openness and cooperative arms control arrangements...

The most urgent need of the moment is to develop a political framework capable of addressing the multiple sources of instability in Europe and equipped with the means to take effective action. There is no shortage of European and transatlantic organizations with varying degrees of relevance and competence—the CSCE, NATO, the EC and the Western European Union (WEU). None have proved adequate to the problems currently affecting Europe. Many observers would like to see the CSCE emerge as the supreme arbiter of security in Europe or, at a minimum, be able to guide rather than follow events. However, it remains to be seen whether governments will have sufficient confidence in the CSCE to provide it with the means necessary to fulfill a more ambitious and active role.

It is also important to note in this context that the signing of the Tashkent agreement on common defence by Russia and other CIS states constitutes a new element in the future European security structure.

In the meantime, the system of interlocking institutions—each of the existing organizations, NATO, the EC and WEU contributing to European Security in its own way and feeding into the broader CSCE—will continue. In this system, it will be essential to ensure a rational division of labour—a pooling of comparative advantage—between the various organizations and that they interact effectively and are mutually reinforcing. While acknowledging that because of their limited membership NATO, the EC and the WEU are more effective in decision-making than the somewhat unwieldy CSCE, this exclusivity must not undermine the collective nature

of the overall process. No exclusionary group of countries can speak on behalf of Europe. Therefore, the manner in which these organizations relate to the CSCE will be significant...

The dilemma over NATO's future role and the degree to which it can contribute to European security in a more active sense has centered over the need for a separate European defence identity [ESDI]. Most countries see a more distinct ESDI as inevitable, complementing the political and economic integration of the European Community. However, there are serious differences over how far this separateness should go and how it should be developed. Some see an ESDI strengthening the alliance and therefore wish to see it tied more intimately with the NATO structure. Others envisage eventually replacing NATO and therefore seek to enhance the relationship of ESDI to the European Union. The nine-member WEU has emerged as the compromise vehicle within which the ESDI will be developed. The debate is now about the appropriate relationship between the WEU and NATO and the Union respectively, where consultation will take place, and how the operational dimension should be handled. This debate will have consequences for the broader development of all European security arrangements.

Progress in curbing arms transfers—particularly to volatile regions of the world—is a declared objective of the CSCE. Here deeds must match words. This means examining new approaches to the problem, building on the work of forums such as the MTCR [Missile Technology Control Regime], Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] and the London Suppliers Club and, most importantly, harnessing collective political will. The abundance of hard-currency potential weaponry available in the CIS to flood an already saturated international market adds urgency to the situation. However it is important to avoid double standards. In this context, it should be noted that five of the world's top eight major arms exporters are members of the European Community. A new CSCE approach, therefore, must not be perceived as discriminatory or exclusionary if it is to be successful and sustainable...

New criteria for controlling the export of conventional weapons should be consistent with the CSCE's declared priorities: Reducing regional conflicts and tensions and redressing human and minority rights. Such criteria must include respect for international embargoes, respect for human rights, preventing the spread of military technologies, and prohibiting arms exports to countries at war and to regions of tension. Defining criteria and developing structures to monitor and verify implementation will be difficult. However, countries of the CSCE have a special moral as well as a political responsibility to move in this direction. Other regions of the world look to our region, and our institutions, for example as well as for leadership in this and other respects. We should not be found wanting...

The CSCE And its participating states should do everything possible to end these tragic and wasteful conflicts and then to help find solutions which take care of the legitimate interests of all parties. In the case of Yugoslavia, international effort is underway to try to bring about a peaceful solution—as yet to no avail. In Nagorno-Karabakh the CSCE has lent its efforts to reinforce those of the CIS to end the fighting and find a satisfactory settlement.

Looking into the future, it will be critical for the CSCE to identify further potential trouble spots and to act early enough through mediation, deployment of observers, etc. To avert potential conflicts. One example would be to concentrate on preventing the Yugoslav conflict spreading to other regions.

CSCE Parliamentary Assembly approves Declaration
*LD0607093492 Budapest MTI in English 1603 GMT
5 Jul 92*

[Excerpt] Budapest, July 5 (MTI)—The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly approved the following declaration in Budapest today (full text):

We, parliamentary representatives of the CSCE participating states met in Budapest on July 3-5, 1992, as the parliamentary forum of the Charter of Paris to offer our advice to CSCE ministers.

We welcome the representatives of the new CSCE participating states, sharing our principles and values.

We recognize that the management of change can only be successful if pluralist parliamentary democracy, respect for human rights, including minority rights, the rule of law, economic freedom and social justice gain deep roots in our countries and respect for these values is translated into everyday practice.

Aggressive nationalism, violation of minority rights, uncontrolled armed forces and the enormous difficulties accompanying the transition to market economy threaten the stability in the CSCE area and our objective to bring peace, democracy and prosperity to it.

The CSCE has returned to Helsinki after two decades to embark upon a new path full of opportunities and challenges. The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly wishes all success to the meeting of heads of governments of the CSCE participating states to be held on July 9-10, 1992 and brings to their attention the following declarations and recommendations adopted by the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

Chapter I

Security Questions

The CSCE and European Security

1. Security and stability in today's Europe are dependent on political, economic and environmental, as well as

military factors. The major sources of instability are the deteriorating economic and social conditions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as political and nationalist (ethnic) disputes which have resulted in several violent and bloody armed conflicts. Europe must find the means to deal with this endemic instability. The most urgent task is to assist the political and economic reforms now under way in CEE. The failure to improve social conditions will ultimately undermine public support for democracy with serious consequences for the whole of Europe.

2. The deepening of democratic processes represents an essential factor in the reinforcement of European security. Human rights compliance represents an integral element of the European security system. There can be no secure system in the region where there is the violation of essential human rights, including those of national minorities.

3. The CSCE is the only European and transatlantic organisation both in terms of membership and mandate that is able to address the multiple sources of instability in Europe. However, the institutional structures and procedures of the CSCE must be further strengthened. In particular the CSCE must be given the procedures and means to act effectively in preventing and resolving conflict situations both within and between states. These means should include the ability to mandate clearly and precisely peace-keeping activities.

4. As the only institution that embraces all European and North American countries, and with its comprehensive mandate, the CSCE must represent the hope and the future as the framework in which Europe's security concerns can be addressed effectively. At the same time, the CSCE should make use of the organisational capabilities, experience, and infrastructure of regional organisations, such as the WEU [Western European Union], NATO, the EC, and the peace-keeping mechanism of the CIS.

5. Armed forces will continue to perform an important function in all countries. In view of the existing tension in many parts of Europe, the size, structure and deployment of these forces could be a potential source of friction. It is understood, and in compliance with the CSCE principles and aims, that peace and security are established among all CSCE member states, therefore, it is necessary to withdraw without delay any troops or forces of any CSCE country which are stationed or occupy illegally part of another CSCE country, thus terminating such situation that may exist. Arms control has a key role to play in minimizing misunderstanding and encouraging mutual confidence. The new Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) should build on the CFE treaty and the existing CSBMS [expansion unknown] to further reduce and constrain the levels and types of armaments, increase security dialogue and develop cooperative measures that emphasize transparency and openness of military forces and activities.

EAST EUROPE

6. Nuclear weapons are still kept but with roles that are now much more difficult to define, the traditional concept of nuclear deterrence is substantially diminished. All efforts must now be directed at preventing proliferation and ensuring that such weapons are at the lowest possible levels. A new and sensitive approach to the management, reduction, destruction, and elimination of nuclear weapons is an all-CSCE concern.

7. Constraining the proliferation of weapons and weapons technology demands more creative and cooperative action within a CSCE framework. With regard to nuclear and chemical weapons, cautious optimism is in order, though continued vigilance is essential. However, on the question of the proliferation of conventional weapons and technologies, serious dialogue must begin within the CSCE. The establishment of a working group of the FSC is recommended.

8. The reduction and restructuring of armed forces and the consequent contraction of defence industry are causing economic and social problems in all countries. These problems are particularly severe in countries in CEE. Western cooperation and assistance is urgently needed. In particular Western nations should give serious consideration to providing special assistance to the CIS countries in order to facilitate the speedy withdrawal of the former USSR forces from the Central and East European countries. In this context, the withdrawal of former USSR troops still remaining on the territories of the Baltic States without their consent has to be completed in the shortest terms and under international observation provided by the assisting countries. It must be also taken into account that a timely solution of the social and economic problems of military personnel is a necessary condition for maintaining stability during the withdrawal of military forces.

9. Democracy is the best guarantor of peace. It is essential that armed forces in all countries are subordinate to democratic civilian governments. Elected parliaments must have the ultimate authority and responsibility for the activities of the military forces.

10. The Parliamentary Assembly states that the present evolution of the situation regarding security in Europe demands a new examination of the objectives and procedures of the CSCE. It considers that it is necessary to go beyond the Charter of Paris and to envisage a security structure more coherent and more binding.

The Parliamentary Assembly wishes to transform the CSCE into a regional security organization as provided for in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter and to give it a legal base.

11. The deep-going political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe should in no way weaken the already achieved success of the CSCE process that has led to increased military security in Europe. Countries of the CSCE that have not yet ratified the CFE treaty are urged to do so as soon as possible and fully implement it.

Levels of military personnel (including paramilitary units) should be declared by all member states.

12. Parliaments and parliamentarians of the CSCE should participate more actively in the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts. When regional tensions arise, multilateral meetings of parliamentarians of countries should be arranged to foster democratic and peaceful solutions. In this task, the assistance of the CPC in Vienna and OHIDR [Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights] in Warsaw could be useful.

13. Prevention and containment of conflicts should continue to be the permanent task of the CSCE processes and structures. The idea of mandatory conciliation and arbitration should be encouraged, including the possibility of establishing a special forum or chamber for the purpose.

14. We wish that the CSCE continues its efforts in order to settle peacefully conflicts and establishes a convention which reinforces the conciliation and arbitration procedures.

15. The committee acknowledges and appreciates the work of the North Atlantic Assembly in the preparation and functioning of the meeting of the committee. The committee looks forward to a continuation of this cooperation.

CSCE and Environmental Cooperation

The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

1. Considering that security means more than military security and that security has an environmental aspect,
2. Aware of the interdependence between the military and the environmental sectors and that military resources could be used in the fight for a better environment,
3. Referring to the report presented by the UN secretary general to the UNCED [UN Conference on Environment and Development] invites member countries and defence organizations to study the possibilities of—within the framework of the CSCE—integrating military-related resources into environmental strategies, using military means to strengthen the quick response capabilities for dealing with environmental emergencies, and using military means for environmental impact-assessment and decision-making.

New Mechanism for CSCE Peace-Keeping

The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

1. Deplores the continuing violence and conflicts that are unfortunately occurring between members of the CSCE.
2. Considers that the CSCE must give priority to developing effective mechanisms for initiating peace-keeping operations capable of preventing conflict.

3. Recognising that the CSCE currently lacks the means to undertake such peace-keeping missions itself.
4. Urges the Council of Ministers to address urgently making collaboration arrangements with other multilateral organisations and individual member countries which have the means to undertake peace-keeping missions and which could respond to calls from the CSCE and establish the mechanism to begin working on the planning and coordination of peace-keeping efforts.

The Presence of the Former Soviet Army in the Baltic Countries

The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

1. Aware of the legitimate desire of the Baltic nations to live within sovereign states, and the incompatibility existing between this desire and the presence of foreign armed forces on their national territory,
2. Having in particular taken note of the results of the referendum as a result of which a great majority of Lithuanians declared themselves in favour of a withdrawal of ex-Soviet forces from their national territory,
3. Noting that some 130,000 ex-Soviet Army soldiers are still stationed on the territories of the Lithuanian Republic, Estonia and Latvia,
4. Fearing that this situation could, with time, create tension between states of a nature to jeopardize peace and security in this part of Europe,
5. Having taken note of President Yeltsin's commitment to accelerate negotiations around the timing of retreat,
6. Aware of the internal economic and social problems caused within the community of independent states by a return to their home country of ex-Soviet Armed Forces, particularly with regard to housing,
7. Supporting the idea of a European political order within which all human rights and those of national

minorities in these states are fully respected in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter on Human Rights and all CSCE documents in this field,

Invites—The Russian Government to finalize as soon as possible the return home of all ex-Soviet Army forces present on the territories of the Baltic states,

—The Governments of the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to adopt all necessary measures with a view to granting financial assistance for the return home of these Armed Forces, and to negotiate the conditions with all concerned parties. [passage omitted]

POLAND

Reservations on CFE Troop Ceiling Agreement Noted

*LD0607220792 Warsaw PAP in English 1905 GMT
6 Jul 92*

[Text] Vienna, July 6—The Polish ambassador and head of the Polish delegation to Vienna's conference expressed his satisfaction but not enthusiasm following the initialing of an agreement on national troop ceilings signed by 29 countries here on Monday [6 July].

Jerzy Nowak, who was speaking on behalf of the so-called Visegrad Triangle comprising also Hungary and Czechoslovakia, said that the three countries sought for the accord to be a binding treaty and not a political agreement which does not need a ratification by the signatories' parliaments.

“We had hoped for a binding treaty with stronger obligations” to limit troop levels, he said.

The Polish diplomat cited dissatisfaction over lack of provisions on limiting paramilitary forces. The agreement calls only for the exchange of related information.

The agreement, concluded within the framework of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations, sets Poland's land-based military manpower ceiling at 234,000.

EGYPT

Spokesman Applauds U.S.-Russian Nuclear Pact

NC1906135392 Cairo Arab Republic of Egypt
Radio Network in Arabic 1130 GMT 19 Jun 92

[Text] A Foreign Ministry official spokesman has said that Egypt welcomes the agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear warheads.

The Foreign Ministry is studying this important plan in the context of global aspirations to be free of the dangers of nuclear weapons. The Foreign Ministry is focusing on regional initiatives in this respect, including Egypt's proposal to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. This would propel the effort to establish peace and security in the Middle East.

Removal of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Praised

NC0407072392 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0605 GMT
4 Jul 92

[Text] Cairo, 4 Jul (MENA)—AL-JUMHURIYAH commends President George Bush's declaration that his country has completed the withdrawal of all land- and sea-based tactical nuclear U.S. weapons deployed abroad, thus fulfilling its commitments.

In its editorial today AL-JUMHURIYAH praises this declaration and describes it as an important step on the road to world peace and stability. It adds that this could not have happened without the changes in the world environment and the radical changes in Eastern Europe that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and negated NATO's military objectives, particularly in view of the EC's move toward European unity.

The paper notes that as far as the ordinary citizen looking for his livelihood is concerned, this declaration means that the huge funds devoured by the arms trade and those allocated for military expenditures can now be earmarked for development and construction.

AL-JUMHURIYAH adds: The American President and the United States still have to take several other steps, which citizens all over the world are waiting for. By this we mean putting a specific and reasonable ceiling on the arms race, particularly as the new world order has established the principles of dialogue, negotiations, and respect for international legitimacy.

The paper notes in this respect President Husni Mubarak's initiative to eliminate weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and to have the developed countries allocate only one percent of weapons production budgets to reducing the burden of the third world's debts and proceeding with their development programs and plans, thus turning the whole world into a leafy oasis that enjoys stability, peace, and prosperity.

INDIA

Stand at Mideast Arms Control Sub-Group Examined

92WC0050A Madras THE HINDU in English 1 Jun 92
p 7

[Article by F.J. Khergamvala]

[Text] Manama (Bahrain), 31 May: If and when the West Asia peace talks (multilaterals) resume, India is expected to make a detailed presentation of the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) suggested or implemented with her neighbours. Such presentations will also be made by other parties attending the sub-group on Arms Control and National Security in Moscow at a date to be decided later, after the Israeli election process.

The first meeting of this specific sub-group took place in Washington last month, attended by 13 parties from West Asia and seven other delegations, including India, whose team was led by Mr. K.C. Singh, Director, (West Asia and North Africa) in the Ministry of External Affairs and included Mr. Rakesh Sood, a Director in the MEA specialising on disarmament. The team, therefore, had a specialist each on the region and on the subject. This meeting dealt in detail on how the U.S. and the former Soviet Union had step by step established transparency through CBMs leading to binding, verifiable pacts.

Officials from Arab and Israeli delegations felt that the co-sponsors, especially the U.S., had prematurely tried to broaden the agenda of the talks, much to the irritation of Tel Aviv. Initially, the event was to be a seminar but the U.S. proposed a list of CBMs for discussion, which none of the delegations was prepared for. However, the next meeting will go into some detail on transparency measures designed to reduce surprise incidents that could trigger an armed skirmish.

Fragile process: At a meeting of the Steering Committee for the peace talks held in Lisbon last week, Moscow was nominated as the location for the meeting of the arms control sub-group, with the dates left open. The entire peace process appears to be so fragile at the moment and subject to several imponderables which continue to grow by the week. Nonetheless, India seems to see some advantages in following the arms control aspect closely.

At the Moscow meeting, the basis for the Indian presentation is likely to be the proposal made in May 1990 with reference to Pakistan. The CBMs proposed broadly fall under (a) prevention of acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs and, (b) reiteration of the Common Resolve to abide by the Shimla Agreement. India will also detail the agreements reached and those under negotiation. By and large, the list is extremely comprehensive and by themselves can be lifted into the West Asian context. But then there is a vast difference in the two situations.

Thoughtful stand: India's stand at the arms control talks has been a careful one—being supportive of the peace process in general, while not using the forum to announce its own views supporting global rather than regional measures. In any case, New Delhi has staked out its view extremely thoughtfully on the peace process. India hopes the process would lead to a "just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of all problems connected with West Asia acceptable to all the parties concerned."

The last qualifier conforms fully to New Delhi's long-standing position about arms control and disarmament on a regional plane, where India has maintained such as on the nuclear weapons-free zone that it should be acceptable to "all parties" in the region.

At least one prematurely harsh comment on India's role at the Washington meeting has failed to note the nuances in the country's position. This was a forum to discuss West Asian arms control under broad terms of reference agreed to by its direct participants and not a platform to enunciate either India's predicament or push her views. In fact, one Arab source remarked that one delegation had suggested that a meeting of the sub-group could also be held in India. New Delhi feels such subjects are best stewarded by the co-sponsors who have the direct leverage required for prodding the participants towards preliminary CBMs.

Narrowing of differences: Successive meetings between the big five powers who supply 85 per cent of West Asia's arms imports have resulted in a very marginal narrowing of differences. China had suggested concrete limits on the total volume of arms sales to the region but there are countries like the U.S. which follow a policy based on maintaining a balance where its friends are qualitatively arms dominant. This results in a quest for counterbalance by others, such as Syria and Iran.

Washington, much to the chagrin of France, China and other market competitors, also believes that by emerging as the dominant, if not the sole, supplier of major arms systems it is in a position to curb an arms race. Owing to such fundamental differences, the most that the five have agreed upon is notification of arms deals, which in any case is available in published form.

Finally, at some stage, Iran has to be brought into the peace process if arms control is to be meaningful. Kuwait, among others, has suggested this but this opens out the geographical scope of a regional arrangement so much that it has to spill over into areas of Central Asia, Turkey and perhaps Pakistan which then will want linkage with India. Of all the aspects of regional security, the arms control part is the most difficult. To begin with, as yet the Arabs and Jews within Israel itself haven't decided if they wish to live together in peace.

German Official Discusses Chemical Weapons Ban

*BK0907155492 Delhi All India Radio Network
in English 1530 GMT 9 Jul 92*

[Text] India has agreed to work closely with Germany to achieve a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons. The matter came up for discussion at a meeting with the visiting German commissioner for disarmament and arms control, Ambassador (Josef Holleck), and the senior officials of the External Affairs Ministry in the capital. The Indian side reiterated that any convention to ban chemical weapons should be nondiscriminatory and enjoy universal adherence. It should also completely ban development, production, possession, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Ambassador (Holleck) told the Indian side that the delegates attending the Geneva conference on disarmament, now underway, want an agreement to be reached in the current session itself.

IRAN

German Chemical Disarmament Request Supported

*LD0707092892 Tehran IRNA in English 0702 GMT
7 Jul 92*

[Text] Tehran, July 7, IRNA—Iran has given a positive reply to a German request for supporting the chemical disarmament convention draft, on condition that it will not pose problems for the Third World's economic and industrial programmes especially that of chemical industries.

This was announced during a meeting between Deputy Foreign Minister for International Affairs Manuchehr Mottaki and special envoy of the German Government Josif Holik here Monday.

Mottaki pledged that Iran as "a major victim of chemical weapons attack" after World War 2 will actively participate in preparation of the draft according to the Islamic principles of its foreign policy.

However, he remarked that the text and principles of the convention should be universal in application without any biased or discriminatory tendencies, and should also be supported by a surveillance system.

It is under such desirable conditions that observation of the principles of the convention can be ensured by all members, he said.

Holik conveyed a verbal message from German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to Mottaki and praised Iran's active participation in codifying the draft convention in Geneva.

He also called for Tehran-Bonn cooperation in international fields.

The draft is expected to be handed over to the General Assembly of the United Nations for endorsement by all members during the current year.

Germany's Kinkel had earlier called for Iran's support for the draft in a written message to Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velyati.

UN Envoy Denies Reports on Nuclear Ambitions

Letter to Secretary General

NC0807060892 Tehran: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian 0330 GMT 8 Jul 92

[Text] Iran, which initiated the plan to abolish nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, has announced its readiness to implement this plan comprehensively with the participation of the United Nations.

Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations sent a letter to the UN secretary general yesterday in which he described reports on Iranian efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons as baseless, saying: Iran, as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, maintains a peaceful nuclear research program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The letter says that Iran cooperates fully with the IAEA, and that this agency has confirmed that Iran is fulfilling its commitments. The Iranian envoy added that IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear research centers have not produced any evidence corroborating allegations by the mass media.

The letter then refers to the threatening remarks made by the Zionist regime's Air Force commander, saying: The Iranian Government denies reports that it is attempting to gain access to nuclear weapons, and stresses that it views defense against any possible adventurist aggression as its legitimate right.

In conclusion, the letter says: Iran announces its readiness to implement comprehensively the plan for Middle East nuclear disarmament, and considers the Zionist regime's nuclear programs—being pursued outside the framework of international regulations—to be a threat to regional stability.

Nuclear-Free Zone Sought

LD0807084992 Tehran IRNA in English
0747 GMT 8 Jul 92

[Text] United Nations HQ (New York), July 8, IRNA—Iran's permanent envoy to the U.N. Kamal Kharrazi, in a letter to the U.N. secretary general Tuesday, announced Tehran's readiness to cooperate with the world body in implementing the Iranian-initiated plan to turn the Middle East into a zone free of nuclear and other mass destructive weapons.

Kharrazi once again categorically rejected reports alleging that Iran is making efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons. Iran, as a country committed to the atomic weapons non-proliferation convention, conducts its atomic research programmes for peaceful purposes, his letter added.

It further underlined that Iran has always had practical cooperation with the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), noting that the agency after inspecting Iran's nuclear installations on February 19, announced that no evidence was found to support the allegations.

The letter also referred to the threatening statements of the Air Force commander of the Israeli regime against Iran last month, and stressed that Tehran considers as its indisputable right to defend itself against any possible Zionist adventurism or aggression.

Kharrazi in conclusion reiterated that the nuclear plans of the Zionist regime are out of the framework of international regulations and a threat to regional stability.

ISRAEL

Ways of Confronting Nuclear Threat

Impact of U.S.-Russian Accord

92WC0052A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Jun 92
p 2

[Report on interview of Dr. Sergey Oznovishchev by Y. Tal: "Topic of the Day with Dr. Sergey Oznovishchev (Moscow) on the Agreement to Limit Nuclear Weapons Signed by Bush and Yeltsin: Demilitarizing the Middle East from the Atom Will Be the Next Step"; place and date not given]

[Text] [HA'ARETZ] According to the agreement, the United States and Russia are supposed to destroy two-thirds of their nuclear warheads. Does this totally cancel the danger of a worldwide nuclear war?

[Oznovishchev] The danger of this happening has been significantly reduced since the new era of Mikhail Gorbachev began. Yeltsin is following his path, and in the current agreement, the danger of the outbreak of a worldwide nuclear war is being reduced even further. Except that the test of the agreement is its implementation.

[HA'ARETZ] Is it difficult for Russia to implement the agreement?

[Oznovishchev] There are a number of difficulties. The first difficulty is connected to the military and the parliamentary control over the military. Yeltsin can sign any agreement that he wants, but it will be worthless if he does not guarantee the ways to effect it, including,

among other things, addressing the military and starting effective governmental control over it.

Currently, there are conservative elements within the military, devotees of the previous regimes, who do not look kindly upon this agreement and who are liable to try and frustrate its implementation. Yeltsin should have prepared the ground in Russia ahead of time, and he did not do this. This is liable to create difficulties, although they can be surmounted. The second difficulty that I see is economic. The destruction of the missiles is tied to a great monetary expenditure, over \$1 billion in the course of the '90's; without western aid, Russia will have difficulty implementing the agreement.

[HA'ARETZ] Does the cumulative experience from the agreements that have been signed up until now justify the optimism for the new agreement?

[Ozovishchev] All agreements up until now have, essentially, been the introduction for the primary agreement, which we are witnessing now. The majority of the previous agreements spoke of a freeze or limitation of development and production of nuclear weapons, but, apart from the agreement regarding the intermediate missiles in Europe, the other agreements did not necessitate the destruction of nuclear weapons. The current agreement speaks of this, and that is a significant difference.

Realization of the agreement is dependent, of course, upon effective control over its implementation from both sides. I, for example, do not totally depend upon the data delivered by Russian military sources and the other states in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. We must also be convinced that the other side is implementing the agreement in letter and spirit, and, therefore, after determining the general principles of the agreement, the representatives of both armies must be given the opportunity to talk among themselves and to reach an agreement regarding the details of the control process for dismantling and destroying the weapons.

[HA'ARETZ] Even after effecting the agreement, nuclear reservoirs capable of destroying the entire world three times over will remain in U.S. and Russian hands. Would it not have been better to attain the dismantling of a larger number of nuclear weapons?

[Ozovishchev] I am not worried about the number of weapons. Even with such a quantity and, perhaps, even with more than this, the danger of a nuclear war between the two superpowers is not indicated.

You must also understand that we are speaking of a continuous process. In the case of the current agreement, they say that approximately 10 years will be required to reach the dismantling of such a quantity of weapons. This time is also necessary to create trust between the sides.

I am not of the opinion that the time has come for the superpowers, that is, the United States and Russia, to

part from all of the nuclear weapons in their possession. We have not yet reached this millennium.

The danger is not of war between the two superpowers. Threats are likely to shoot up, whose buds are already visible today, against the two superpowers together, that are likely to place the peace of the entire world in jeopardy; therefore, it is essential that the United States and Russia both retain nuclear arsenals. Perhaps this will sound absurd, but these nuclear weapons that are now in the hands of the superpowers contribute more to world peace and its security than would total dismantling.

[HA'ARETZ] In the wake of the agreement, will the superpowers exert more pressure on the dismantling of nuclear weapons in other areas, including the Middle East?

[Ozovishchev] Indirectly, the agreement could decidedly influence in this direction. The signing of the agreement for dismantling nuclear weapons creates the appropriate atmosphere for work in this direction in other areas of the world as well, including the Middle East.

In the days to come, we must consider a new measure for monitoring nuclear weapons. The idea is that anyone retaining such weapons would place their entire weapons dump under UN monitoring. For this purpose, the UN would establish a special body, whose personnel would be permitted to enter all countries' nuclear installations. It would be similar to the operation carried out regarding Iraq, albeit without coercion.

[HA'ARETZ] Is there reason for concern in the world, especially in Israel, over the nuclear weapons that remain in the hands of the Muslim republics in the CIS?

[Ozovishchev] In my opinion, there is no further reason for such concern. Currently, the Muslim republics have no tactical weapons. The weapons that they had have been transferred to Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, and these countries are bound by all international agreements for the nondistribution of nuclear weapons. In my opinion, they greatly exaggerated the reports of nuclear weapons transfer from Muslim republics to other countries, especially in the Middle East. According to all data in my possession, this did not occur.

[HA'ARETZ] To what extent are the Kremlin leaders aware of attempts by Iran and Libya to arm themselves with nuclear weapons?

[Ozovishchev] The leaders of Russia are definitely aware of this, and I am convinced that the subject arose in Yeltsin's discussions with Bush. In my opinion, after signing the agreement, they will turn their attention to working toward the nuclear demilitarization of the Middle East, for they are aware of the fact that without this step, world peace is not ensured at all.

Intelligence, Military Gaps

92WC0052B Tel Aviv *YEDI'OT AHARONOT*
in Hebrew 17 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by 'E. Rosen: "Mossad Agent Will Not Save the World"]

[Text] Two press conferences with two brigadier generals on the General Staff produced two, almost identical, apocalyptic headlines in the newspapers: Nuclear weapons in Iran, perhaps in Syria, too, a danger to survival, world war, disturbing the strategic balance in the Middle East.

In both cases, the brigadier generals were also quoted as ones calling for action by every means—political, military, intelligence—in order to frustrate, prevent, and keep the evil schemes from spreading terror.

Whoever participated in these two press conferences knows that, even if the headlines came out identical, the contents were different. The head of the Intelligence Branch, Brigadier General Uri Shagai, painted a very complex, multifaceted picture of changes in the region.

He spoke with concern of the armaments race and the unconventional ambitions of Syria and, particularly, Iran; of the dangers that, if this activity is not interrupted, Iran will have nuclear weapons in less than 10 years.

But, on the other hand, Shagai also spoke of changes of another type: of the collapse of Syria's strategic support (the Soviet Union) and its worsening economic difficulties, of Syria's difficulties in acquiring advanced military equipment, so that Assad understands that the aspiration for a strategic balance with Israel is more distant today than ever. Of the peace process as a positive factor.

Air force commander Brigadier General Herzl Bodinger, made do with a simpler and gloomier presentation of matters. His words on the fact that Israel must aspire to attack every Arab nuclear operation were clear and loudly heard.

Only in a whisper, almost as an aside, and in response to a question, Bodinger agreed that life is not as simple as it was in May '81. For even if Israel knew exactly where the Arab nuclear devices were being constructed, it is no longer possible to destroy them in one brilliant and successful air force operation. The Arabs learned their lesson, nuclear operations descended from the heights of the reactors to beneath the ground, and now—unlike '81—they now have a very effective response to an Israeli attack: long-range ground-to-ground missiles.

It is the job of military personnel to worry and sound the alarm. The head of the Intelligence Branch must bring the information, and the commander of the air force, the operational solutions. Other bodies, such as the Mossad, for example, must follow and work toward frustrating and obstructing the processes. It is true that it is very difficult to diminish the severity of the developments in

Iran. For the time being, Tehran, much more than Damascus, is the primary source of threat, perhaps even a threat to survival, that appears on the horizon.

At any rate, the solution is not military, nor does it merely lie in the continuation of our defensive occupation of the casbahs of Nablus and the alleys of Jeblayia.

Amil and his detectives will continue with a precise follow-up of every particle of enriched uranium and every Russian scientist that boards a plane going to Tehran. The IDF [Israel Defense Forces] must prepare operational plans. In contrast, Israel's government and defense leadership must remember that the game of "find the missile" is not the main one.

Gone are the days when a daring Mossad agent or F-16 jet could save the world. The rules of the game are changing. Sooner or later Arab countries will rise up on the nuclear course. The solution is political, and it is to be found around the negotiating table. This is a solution that requires bold steps and real initiative from the Israeli side. It is much more complex than the headlines that were so gloomy and clear, published this week in the newspapers.

And it is urgent. Extremely urgent.

Peace Agreement Necessary

92WC0052C Tel Aviv *YEDI'OT AHARONOT*
in Hebrew 16 Jun 92 p 23

[Article by 'E. Habar: "Who Is Not Afraid of Nuclear War"]

[Text] The most important declaration of the past week, past month, past year, was heard by the air force commander, Brigadier General Herzl Bodinger. In his full professional authority, he stated that Iran and Syria are liable to be armed with atomic bombs within 10 years. One would have to be a complete idiot to argue with Bodinger, who put the subject on the agenda, and one would have to be even a greater idiot to say: Ten years? Good Lord. We have learned that 10 years pass very quickly (reminder: 20 years have already passed since that terrible Yom Kippur). And one would have to be totally blind to ponder to oneself: The Arabs and the atomic bomb? Those primitives?

This is approximately what we all said up until the Gulf War, one year ago or so. On the eve of that war I wrote, by the way, that it is possible that Saddam Husayn has something that we do not know about, and I hinted of atomic matters—and all of the heroes of Israel's writing desks assailed me. After the war, it became clear that, uh oh!, another six months or year at the most, and Saddam would have had a nuclear installation that no one knew about.

Arab countries have been making efforts for years to acquire an atomic bomb, in the knowledge that there is no other way to subdue Israel. As is known, Iraq was on

the brink. Pakistan has nuclear capability, and Libya, Algeria, and Syria are striving for it. It is only a question of time.

Whoever is still convinced that we are supermen for whom the entire world is a doormat being tread upon by our feet now laughs: we will know about the bomb in time. Why else do we have the acclaimed Mossad, and military intelligence, and good Jews who will report to us in time. Indeed, the last Iraqi attempt taught us the hard way, that it is possible to build an atomic bomb, without our knowing about it. Without our knowing about it? And the Americans with their tens of thousands of CIA agents? And the KGB? And the French? And the Iranians? What did they know? Thousands were involved in the building of the Iraqi bomb, and not one was found who, for a few pennies, would tell the western world.

So what does the Israeli superman say: OK, we will destroy the Iranian or the Syrian bomb, or both of them. We already did this in the past, and the head of the Intelligence Branch, Uri Shagai, hinted of such a possibility last week. The Israeli who still wakes up every morning humming the Entebbe hymn is convinced that there is a solution and we, therefore, will find it. The Jewish brain will invent a device for us. Either yes or no. And if not, what then?

And, in order to comfort and be comforted before he goes to sleep, the Israeli hero soothes himself and his wife: what of the Arabs and atomic technology—how could they be the ones with the intellect (and formula) to build a bomb. Years ago, the atomic secrets were hidden, and few knew them. In the United States, they hung spies who revealed atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. And in our days, it is possible to say with little exaggeration, that atomic secrets are rolling down the street. And worse than that: The collapsing Russia is swarming with thousands of scientists who, for a hot dog in a roll, will sell atomic secrets without thinking twice. A house in the suburbs of Baghdad and a jacuzzi in a nice corner of Damascus would turn them into devils in the building of a bomb.

What is the conclusion to be drawn from everything stated until now? That we are heroes and smart and elite

and God is on our side, yet we do not have to exaggerate. There exists a real danger to our physical lives here, and no Uzi of Rabbi Levinger, who dances in the alleys of Hebron, will help us in time of trouble. And from here, the result is that we have only a certain amount of time, the span of a few years, very few years, to reach full peace with the Arab countries around us, and, it is worthwhile to do so, even at a cost and with concessions, before Syria, Iran, Libya, and Algeria have atomic bombs.

And on this they would have written in our place years ago: And one hour earlier is nice.

PAKISTAN

Official Affirms Position on Chemical Weapons

*BK0507091592 Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network
in Urdu 0200 GMT 5 Jul 92*

[Text] Dr. (Josef Holleck), the German commissioner on arms reduction and control, held talks with Foreign Affairs Secretary General Akram Zaki on the text of the draft on chemical weapons convention in Islamabad yesterday. Dr. (Holleck) is currently visiting Pakistan in connection with the ongoing Geneva meeting on imposing restrictions on chemical weapons.

The secretary general told Dr. (Holleck) that Pakistan wants an early settlement on the convention on chemical weapons. Akram Zaki emphasized that Pakistan does not possess chemical weapons, nor is it producing such a weapon. He categorically said that Pakistan is committed to a complete restriction on the production, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons.

Akram Zaki emphasized that Pakistan does not possess chemical weapons, nor is it producing such a weapon. He categorically said that Pakistan is committed to a complete restriction on the production, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons. The secretary general apprised the visitor of the regional situation, as well as Pakistan's nuclear policy and its efforts for keeping South Asia free from nuclear weapons, especially in line with the prime minister's proposal for a five-nation meeting on this issue.

GENERAL

Lithuania Bans Transfer of Nuclear Arms Across Border

*OW2506192292 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1910 GMT 25 Jun 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian parliament has adopted a law on the state border banning the movement nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in either direction. Foreign army contingents or transit military cargoes will cross the borders under Lithuania's international agreements.

The resolution on effecting the law says that the Lithuanian parliament has no objections to the visa-free crossing of Lithuania's borders by people carrying the passports of Iceland, Latvia, Estonia and the United Kingdom.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

Nuclear Expert Urges Retention of Deterrent

PM2406115892 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Yuriy Trutnev, first deputy scientific leader at Arzamas-16, by S. Ivanov and Ye. Umerenkov, at 'recent' international conference on "The Democratization of Society and Military Security"; place and date not given: "How Many Guns You Need To Ensure That They Are Not Fired"]

[Text] Apparently the doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency" is taking possession of the minds of our politicians and nuclear scientists.

Many of our nuclear scientists who until recently were "top secret" took part for the first time in the recent international conference on "The Democratization of Society and Military Security." One of them was Yuriy Trutnev, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and first deputy scientific leader from Arzamas-16. Immediately after delivering his report he found himself surrounded by guests from the United States.

"Where are the plants where nuclear weapons are assembled? Pinsk? Chelyabinsk?"—one American kept asking.

"I don't really know," our academician replied.

The guest did not give up: "How is your work on third-generation nuclear weapons going?"

"How is yours going?"

"In our country they say it's of no interest."

"It's of no interest in our country either."

The American nodded understandingly. In view of his lack of success, we continued the "interrogation."

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Yuriy Alekseyevich, what are the limits nowadays on how candid our nuclear experts are with their colleagues from the United States? Who asks most questions: them or you?

[Trutnev] They ask a lot of questions, but they don't answer all ours. True, we aren't always in a great hurry to answer theirs either. Although compared with the way it used to be, we are far more open. But within limits, of course. So as not to do anything detrimental to the country's defense capability or violate commitments relating to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

You know, too many items on nuclear weapons, including purely specialized items, now appear in the open American press. And I think they often contain information contrary to nonproliferation commitments. In this respect we show considerably more restraint than the Americans.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Isn't this the result of our old desire to keep absolutely everything secret?

[Trutnev] It is simply a sense of responsibility. You can see that secrecy has been reduced markedly here, even foreigners come to visit us now...But there are things we simply can't talk about if we don't want nuclear weapons to proliferate across the world.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] They say the range of the SS-20 is sufficient for a missile from Baghdad to reach Lugansk...

[Trutnev] Yes, it's sufficient. Anything is possible, theoretically. Theoretically, it is possible to buy nuclear experts too.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Is it not the case that the process of disarmament of the two nuclear superpowers, combined with the possibility of Third World countries making a nuclear bomb, is making global security less safe than in the days of the "stable" confrontation of recent years?

[Trutnev] One thing I am sure of is that a nuclear conflict is hardly likely to break out between us and Europe. They have too good a life, too much to lose. And we have no reason to make war on them. They need us and we need them, provided, of course, that they don't regard us solely as a source of raw materials. But there are still plenty of reasons for crises in the world. For instance, how many people can the earth feed? We once asked the Americans: Can you guarantee that all countries will have your standard of living? They replied: No. So there is your source of conflict.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Bombs as a deterrent. But how many do you need for that purpose?

[Trutnev] Formerly, only a large number of nuclear weapons allowed us to hope that even given the destruction of 90 percent or more of our own systems (as I understand it, we did not intend to inflict the first strike), the potential would be preserved for a retaliatory strike. So that is how it was—a race. Now the situation is different, the political guidelines have changed, and neither we nor the Americans need such a quantity of weapons. But the process of reductions should be bilateral and proceed on a basis of parity.

I believe it is necessary for nuclear weapons to be a deterrent, but in such a way as to have the least possible effect on the civilian population, that is, we should make them battlefield weapons. New tasks make new demands on the means of nuclear deterrence. I am talking about third-generation nuclear weapons, which were already being developed [razrabatvalos] in our country. I hope there will be a fourth generation too...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So to whom should this threat of unacceptable damage be "addressed"?

[Trutnev] As I understand it, Russia has not yet finally formulated a military doctrine, a concept for arms systems. At the same time we no longer say: Here is a specific enemy. This means that defense is necessary in all salients, taking into account the changing political situation in the world. Where, from what quarter, a threat could arise—that is a matter for the politicians and diplomats. But we have to have guarantees of defense, guarantees of deterrence. The Russian president stated recently that our missiles are not now targeted on the United States. But the Americans confirmed that their missiles are still targeted on us. That's politics for you. We propose one thing, they say another.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] But maybe the very existence of nuclear weapons is an obstacle to confidence?

[Trutnev] First, the process of creating and strengthening confidence cannot be very sudden. Although recently the possibility of nuclear conflict has certainly lessened considerably. Second, what do people mean when they say: Let's ban nuclear weapons and think of something else that could act as a deterrent. And replace nuclear weapons with some other mass destruction weapon? Some peacemakers! Nuclear weapons are political weapons, and the very fact of possessing them forces a possible adversary to consider whether it is worth his while to attack, to start a conflict.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] So for the time being nuclear terror is a "good thing" that we cannot do without?

[Trutnev] Do you know what their attitude to this is in America? They are proud to have carried out an impressive nuclear project, and the Livermore and Los Alamos laboratories are seen as a national asset. In our case, nuclear centers are apparently the source of all our ills—they stripped the country bare, they made enemies

of practically the whole world. What are we, misanthropists, or what? We fulfilled our duty honorably, strengthening defense capability in the context of the political realities that existed at the time. Go and ask the politicians, those who created this confrontation! What were we supposed to do, give up work?

That is not how we were raised. Even Sakharov worked with enthusiasm. But now they cast us as the enemy: Those nuclear scientists, they're to blame. It's not true. We are in favor of reductions, in favor of an eventual ban on nuclear weapons. But you have to act on the basis of realities: When the world community is integrated to a sufficient degree, then the question of nuclear weapons will disappear.

Yeltsin Said To Concede More Than Gorbachev

PM2406121592 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian

20 Jun 92 p 4

[Commentary by Viktor Linnik [V.L.] under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "We Do Not Count the Cost—The Russian President Stretches Out a Hand to America To Keep His Government From Turning Up Its Toes"]

[Text] And so, the Russian president's "truly historic"—as some papers in a loyal passion rushed to subscribe it—visit to the United States has ended. Things really are pretty bad with the creative imagination of the mass media which serve the present authorities if all they managed to come up with was to repeat the epithet "historic," which has bored us all to tears over the last 20 years, affixed to every high-level Soviet-U.S. contact. The only novelty that we can see lies in the fact that the current visit really is historic, unlike all the previous ones which, when put to the test, turned out to be nothing of the sort. In short, it is just as in Gogol's comedy: a second "Yuriy Miloslavskiy," exactly like the first...

However, in one sense it is possible to agree with this assessment. The visit is truly historic because it drew a line under the era of nuclear missile parity between the USSR and the United States, which had lasted just under a quarter of a century. The same parity which, if the words uttered by B. Yeltsin in Washington are to be believed, doomed half the Russian people to deprivation and oppression. (As if the six-month tornado of Gaydar's reforms was no more than the malicious invention of the "reds and browns"—V.L.) But strictly speaking, what else can be expected from the authorities which number in the ranks of their warmest supporters people for whom the victory over Germany in the Patriotic War was the greatest of evils?

You would not envy Yeltsin's U.S mission. If you peel off the shell of turgid rhetoric about the new era of partnership and common ideals of freedom and democracy which gushed forth in a mighty torrent during these days from the two presidents' lips, then he went to the United States essentially with one purpose: to beg for U.S. help to save his government, which is desperately losing popularity. The whole strategy and tactics of the

visit were tailored in order to obtain \$24 billion in the form of credits, investments, and deferred loans.

Almost everything was done for the sake of this: Yeltsin gave up the "pearl" in the USSR's strategic arsenal—the SS-18 heavy missiles which, as the saying goes, was a thorn in the Americans' flesh. For the sake of this the ABM Treaty, which has been one of the mainstays of security over the last 20 years, was in effect renounced. The alternative proposed—participation in a global defense system—is still entirely shrouded in mist. It is unclear, a high-ranking representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs remarked to me in conversation, what role will be assigned to Russia in this system—maybe a little bigger, or maybe a little smaller, than Israel's. Finally, for the sake of this, a public striptease was performed on the eve of the visit over the fate of U.S. pilots lost in the skies over the USSR in the last 35 years. Now there is the clearest example of zeal outrunning intelligence! This move, which, according to its devisers' plan, was supposed to display a picture of our complete openness to the Americans, had a completely unexpected impact. It virtually overshadowed the entire visit, because the Americans talked far more about this than all the other "breakthroughs" during the "historic" visit. It reached the point where, in the heat of the moment, many legislators actually began spouting total absurdities: No aid to Russia until it returns the prisoners to their homeland. In short, in a fit of masochism they hung up "communism's dirty linen" in broad daylight and the Russian president, apart from everything else, had to wash himself. Clearly Yeltsin was aiming at Gorbachev, who answered similar questions from the Americans about the prisoners with Gromyko's "nyet," but he hit...Bush, who has several times been reproached by presidential candidate R. Perot with lacking insistence over the search for American MIA's. Considering how Bush is losing to Perot in all voter opinion polls, it is obvious how much Yeltsin's frankness "helped" Bush...

Finally, for the sake of obtaining the \$24 billion, Yeltsin hurled curses at the "communist idol." How convincing these polemics sounded from the lips of a man who until quite recently was one of the high priests of that idol is another question....

Let us say at once that for us the question is not: to disarm or not to disarm? The answer is yes, undoubtedly. But not at any price! And this price turns out to be manifestly disproportionate to the dividends which we have obtained from it. The "Freedom Support" bill, which contains part of the \$24 billion which the Russian Government has dinned into the ears of all true Russians, still remains in the U.S. Congress. PRAVDA as far back as January wrote that we should not expect to obtain big money in a U.S. election year, since no U.S. president could allow himself to throw U.S. taxpayers' money around. Since then the infamous events in Los Angeles have occurred, which—believe it—have put a stop this year to any money injections of any substance into the Yeltsin government.

The U.S. President promised the Russian president to grant Russia most-favored trading status. An impressive result of the last seven years of our foreign policy, it cannot be denied. Let us just note that China has had this status for several years already (with a minor interruption) without changing, as we know, anything in its foreign policy or its system.

Yeltsin hinted to U.S. businessmen that, if they do not invest money now, the Russian market will be full within a year. That is just whistling in the dark! Western investments are today pouring into China, not Russia. Why? Because there is a stable system there, and therefore businessmen can bring back their money. But Yeltsin, it follows from Western commentaries, said nothing about what is most important to businessmen—guarantees for their capital investments.

After the country's shield—the air defense system—was essentially punched full of holes by the USSR's collapse, its sword too—the most valuable part of the Soviet nuclear potential—is now being emasculated. No wonder that B. Yeltsin was granted thunderous ovations in the U.S. Congress. I should think so! There is no mention of this kind of disarmament striptease on the Potomac. Even the phenomenal concessions of Gorbachev's foreign policy pale into insignificance before it!

"Ah!" the government's adorers exclaimed in one voice. "A wonderful breakthrough in nuclear arms reductions has been achieved in only five months! And the previous phase of reductions took nine long years." It would be in keeping with the same logic to conclude that the current constellation of Russian diplomats are ten times cleverer and more efficient than the previous ones! Indeed, it is only too clear that with the current approaches matters can be arranged much faster. After all, a minute is all it takes to throw your cards on the table. Today the most important thing in diplomacy has been forgotten—that it is a long, painful process of exchanging compromise for compromise. And all in the name of defending our own national interests! But these interests are not seen today from the windows of Smolensk Square or Staraya Ploshchad, or from behind the crenulated Kremlin walls. It is to be hoped that the Russian parliament, which is due to ratify the agreement signed, will look at it without the enthusiasm that has been de rigueur in recent years.

Deputy Assails Framework Arms Cut Agreement PM2406133992 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Jun 92 p 3

[“Position” article by Russian Federation people's deputy Nikolay Pavlov: “Bankruptcy”]

[Text] By declaring in Washington the abandonment of the ideology of parity of strategic armaments and signing a memorandum on questions of deep and large-scale cuts in strategic armaments and other agreements, Russian President B. Yeltsin ended his presidency. No decent and honest person can have any doubt about that. What he did during the U.S. visit finished him as a politician,

human being, and Russian citizen. I am well aware of what I am saying. Indeed, what he did and what the Supreme Soviet will do in response to his actions is bound to lead to a switch to abrupt exacerbation of the struggle with the present regime.

Do not be too keen to accuse me of calling for unconstitutional action. I have always stood for and continue to stand exclusively for legal methods of struggle, which is why "Working Russia" leader Viktor Anpilov apparently once called me a bourgeois liberal and why a pensioner at a recent meeting in Novgorod, which I attended with People's Deputy Ilya Konstantinov, was even more scathing in calling me an agent of Yeltsin. "Why do you regard me in that way?" I asked him. "I used to be in charge of a shop, then I was pensioned off in the first batch, and now I have bought no meat or butter at all for four months. And you are urging me to observe the Constitution."

This crime—not only against ethnic Russians, against the people of Russia, but against the whole world—must be stopped. This preposterous imbalance will lead to the appearance of a world gendarme, who may decide tomorrow to destroy 100 hospitals or residential areas somewhere, as he did recently in Iraq. He is already saber-rattling, wanting to destroy Serbia. The willfulness of the world gendarme, in the form of the United States, will lead to consequences which we cannot even imagine.

I conducted the parliamentary hearings on strategic nuclear armaments. The four experts with excellent qualifications who participated in the talks and were present at the signing of the treaty by Bush and Gorbachev sounded the alarm, considering that treaty extremely disadvantageous to us.

During the talks the system that was used for counting nuclear warheads on various types of delivery vehicles was disadvantageous to us.

According to the counting rules adopted during the talks, after the implementation of the 31 July 1991 treaty the USSR is left with 5,753 nuclear warheads and the United States with 6,000. That is, parity appears to be observed. But, according to Candidate of Technical Sciences Reserve Colonel V. Dmitriev, an expert who participated in the Soviet-American talks on strategic offensive armaments, if the nuclear warheads are counted by a different system, you get entirely different figures, namely 6,251 for the USSR and 11,348 for the United States, that is, nearly twice as many. Although not all experts agree with this approach, it would be extremely irresponsible to underestimate even an isolated opinion in such an important matter; after all, we are talking about the country's defense capability and security.

The proposed option for the further reduction of strategic offensive weapons, signed in Washington, weakens our defense capability even more, since it envisages in the future the complete destruction of our main nuclear potential, which comprises land-based MIRVed ICBM's. Whereas the main U.S. potential is concentrated on

aircraft and submarines and is only slightly affected by the treaty. It was for that reason that Yeltsin was forced to declare in Washington that we would not bother with petty calculations. But if these calculations are made by objective experts, it reveals a massive imbalance between the nuclear warhead levels in favor of the United States. An insane step has been taken toward our self-destruction and unconditional switch to the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, since the destruction of our land-based strategic missiles is nothing but the complete abandonment of an independent state policy and total surrender.

That is the result of B. Yeltsin's two-year spell at the helm of Russia, which is losing its independence.

Our state's economic security is nonexistent. More than once Gaydar has made it plain that unless we follow the "course of reforms" we will be refused credits and we will have to face anarchy, chaos, and social upheaval.

To be honest, you need considerable imagination to be able then to talk about Russian policy as the policy of an independent state. In fact, they have ceased to rate us already! Suffice it to recall the U.S. sanctions against the Main Space Administration when it tried to sell one of its missile technologies to India. You do not deal with independent states like that. Let alone a great power, as we sometimes still call ourselves out of habit.

What about the military sphere? In one year of the presidency the army disintegrated, on a massive scale that beggars understanding. The army is ceasing to be manageable and is losing its combat capability and the qualities that make it an army.

The criminal destruction of the Union state has radically reduced the defense capability of all the CIS countries and, certainly, of the Russian Federation. By losing the Transcaucasus and the Baltics, which were part of the single Union state, we lost ABM systems which cannot function normally without the proper stations. But the stations are located in the aforementioned regions. The damage runs to hundreds and hundreds of billions of rubles [R].

Borders, which do not have to be closed but must be controlled, are a very important sign of state sovereignty. At the moment the Russian borders are practically wide open. Anyone can get into any part of the country across the Moldavian-Romanian border or the border with Turkey. Turkey is a member of the NATO system, and it is naive to think that it is a 100-percent friendly country. Meanwhile, the Americans have not reduced expenditure on intelligence and do not intend to. Moreover, they are strengthening all these areas. What we see, however, is total collapse. In short, Russian economic and military security does not exist at the moment.

I remember B.N. Yeltsin in his inaugural speech on 10 July 1991, on becoming president, promising that "the aberrant tradition of dividing ourselves into the righteous and the guilty, into us and them, into those who are

with us and those who are not with us will be a thing of the past." Well, the result of the president's two-year policy is a split in society which he has personally contributed to. His words about enemies who have to be fought, even if they are women, will go down in Russian history. He called my colleagues Svetlana Goryacheva and her comrades who were party to the policy statement enemies. No one will ever forget that.

Now Yeltsin says in an interview that certain party structures are forming a strike force and posing a threat. I would suggest to Boris Nikolayevich that he look at the list of his secretary colleagues in party oblast committee, that he scrutinize the names that are painfully familiar to him, the names of people he sat on the Central Committee with for 15 years or so. Some 70 percent of these gentlemen are working in commercial structures and they have no intention of forming any kind of strike force.

When he makes these statements the president is banking on the ignorance of our duped and tormented people. He is sowing the seeds of hatred and it is beginning to erode society.

It was he who called the majority of the people, who are so poor and hungry that they have already started to protest in the streets, the "red-browns." When he was in Paris, seeking credits from so-called friends who dream about the collapse of our country, he worried them by saying that the "red-browns" would bring him down if he did not obtain credits. The president was alluding to the generally law-abiding citizens who were coming out to protest against the 15-20-30-fold increase in prices, whereas in the West they go on strike when things go up by two-three percent. There they have indexation. But where is the indexation that we were promised?

Add to that the total collapse of the financial system, hyperinflation, mass production shutdown, anarchy, and chaos in the juridical sphere, which do not enhance civil accord...In every respect society has taken a giant step backward and gone in the worst possible direction. That is, we are witnessing the complete bankruptcy of the president's course. It is the bankruptcy of the president himself, because he led that course and was its most active champion. Even Mr Volskiy is now talking about a 30-percent decline in production. Although it took him five months to get to grips with the president's "reforms" and announce that he did not support them, that he was also somewhat in opposition....

In December we, a few parliamentary factions, opposed the government for the first time, on the basis of a forecast by economic experts, not on the basis of emotion. Where were they then, the gentlemen who are now beginning to play for the opposition? They were applauding and saying: The president's course is a remarkable one. Now even Grigoriy Yavlinskiy has decided to come out with jarring criticism of this course.

The economy is in a state of collapse. The decline is of a greater magnitude than during the war. In just the past

five months it has reached 35 percent compared with last year. Industry Minister Titkin said in the Supreme Soviet that slump scenarios of as much as 50 percent are already being envisaged!

Finally, the very latest and most important result of our president's activities is the destruction of the state. Even if Yeltsin had done nothing bad these two years, if everything had been fine, the president would never be forgiven by God on the Day of Judgment for the mere fact that by making a deal with the presidents of Belarus and Ukraine in the Belovezhskaya Forest he deliberately destroyed our state. He did not create that state, he did not defend it in the Great Patriotic War. It was my father who went to the front in 1941 and fought for a united country. Along with another 27 million Soviet people.

The consequences of the destruction of the Union, which the "Rossiya" deputies' faction warned about, are becoming increasingly apparent to an increasing number of people. The current carnage in Benders and Tskhinvali is entirely the responsibility of the destroyers of the united state and is a direct result of the so-called Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy.

As a Russian [russkiy], I will never forgive Yeltsin for having left 25 million of my Russian blood-brothers (if you add to that the so-called russophones, you get a grand total of 30 million ethnic Russians [rossiyane!]) abroad with a flourish of the pen in the Belovezhskaya Forest, turning them into people without a homeland, stateless people with no right to their native language and normal cultural development, in fact without any rights at all.

We have said and will continue to say that there are two paths of development. Either we have a united state within the 1945 borders—that is the bottom line for us—or there will begin a long period of social upheavals. And not because I or a Sidorov or Petrov want it, but because it is an objective process—no one can prevent it. Human beings, peoples will see the light sooner or later and life itself will nudge them toward unity, toward gathering the country together.

The destruction of the Union had a direct effect on Russia's security. An unprecedented sabotage operation has been carried out against our country and the Russian people, which has set Russia back four centuries.

Under the current president Russia has begun to betray its allies. We have essentially abandoned foreign policy independence and are following in the wake of the U.S. course. More and more Russia is becoming a U.S. puppet. B. Yeltsin sanctioned the UN vote for measures against Serbia and Montenegro. The latest decision caused our patience to run out, and we, 17 opposition bloc deputies, put out a statement on the resignation of the government and the president. We realize that the presidential impeachment procedure is a very long and complex process. But we are not extremists. We do not want to bring society to the barricades; that is not our way. But we believe that it is necessary to tell the

country's citizens and the world community honestly and frankly that our president has lost credibility among political forces. And, I venture to suggest, among the people.

We believe we are entitled to directly address all who cherish Russia's future. Our country's citizens will continue to suffer while they, together with us, the deputies, make many mistakes which we must have the courage to admit. In fact, they are in a daze, as a result of the freedom, as a result of the promises, as a result of being able to turn round and spit on their past. We have been dancing on graves for six years. We have been trampling on the remains of our fathers and grandfathers for six years. For six years we have been behaving like slavering madmen, gleefully rummaging among our fathers' and grandfathers' mistakes, without analyzing our own. It is a terrible sin and God will punish us for it...

I have less and less faith in our parliamentary body, less and less faith that with one step more we will manage to make people change their minds, to show them. A loaf of bread now costs R [rubles] 13 in Moscow, only recently it cost R6. Have wages doubled? How much longer do we have to wait? For all the pensioners to die off?

I want citizens to realize that without their active support at such a crucial time politicians, even the most remarkable ones, will accomplish nothing.

This brings me back to the folly perpetrated in Washington. No, I am not urging non-observance of the Constitution, but unless the Supreme Soviet manages to denounce the agreements concluded by the president, then I say in all earnestness that Russian red brigades will emerge. The state security system is nonexistent. The country is stuffed with chemical and nuclear weapons. The storm could begin here tomorrow, and then the rallies at Ostankino will look like child's play.

Finally, you must appreciate this. You must not bring the people to their knees in this way.

'Common Approaches' to START Implementation at Dagomys

LD2406131692 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0945 GMT 24 Jun 92

[By Andrey Naryshkin, ITAR-TASS observer on military issues]

[Text] Moscow, 24 Jun (TASS)—One of the most important issues discussed at the Russian-Ukrainian summit meeting in Dagomys was the status of the Commonwealth strategic forces deployed on the territory of the Ukraine. Today in a conversation with the ITAR-TASS observer, Lieutenant General Ivashov, secretary of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers, noted the fact that of late many unclear points have arisen with regard to these forces both on the part of the Ukraine and on the part of the commanders in chief of the CIS joint armed forces and of the Russian Federation. In particular there are

differences regarding issues of administration of the Commonwealth strategic forces, bringing them up to strength, swearing of allegiance, and ensuring the security of the strategic nuclear missile complexes.

All these problems were the subject of discussion in Dagomys on the level of ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, and experts of the two states. The common approach of the sides to them was sufficiently constructive, Lieutenant General Ivashov thinks. And although accord was not reached on all aspects, nevertheless progress is obvious. It is already important that Russia and Ukraine have come to an understanding of each other's problems, they have agreed to resume the talks on strategic forces. Thus, already on 2 July in Moscow, the day before the start of the routine sitting of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers, the military delegations of Russia and the Ukraine are to meet. Together with the commanders-in-chief of the CIS joint Armed Forces they will draw up draft documents on the Commonwealth strategic forces for examination by the heads of state, and some of the questions will possibly be resolved even at their level.

I think, Leonid Ivashov said, that we will reach an understanding on the need for the united administration of the strategic forces. This is also important because the dual subordination of them—on which the Ukrainian side insists—erodes the responsibility of specific officials and specific states for nuclear safety before the world community and their own peoples.

Common approaches toward the matter of implementing the treaty on strategic offensive weapons were also successfully found in Dagomys. In particular, Russia and Ukraine agreed to take additional measures to enable this treaty to be ratified in the near future and also to inform one another about steps in the sphere of strategic arms limitation.

As far as the Black Sea Fleet is concerned, specific accords on this were not expected at the Dagomys meeting, only the principles for the division of its forces and property were under discussion. But the very fact that the sides came to an understanding of the need to create both Russian and Ukrainian navies on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet represents, in Leonid Ivashov's opinion, some progress. I think that the state delegations of Russia and Ukraine which are conducting the negotiations process in this sphere will be able to decide the ratios by which the fleet will be divided, what its status will be, and the conditions under which it will be based, the secretary of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers concluded.

U.S. Senate Hearings on START Treaty Viewed

Concern Over Multilateral Aspect

PM2606100792 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Aleksandr Shalnev: "START Treaty Ratification: Not Everyone in U.S. Congress Believes in Non-nuclear Ukraine"]

[Text] Washington—"Ratify the START treaty!...Otherwise, we will merely add strategic uncertainty to economic and political uncertainty, and there is plenty of that in the former Union. If that happens we will be doing a disservice to the CIS states and, worst of all, to the American people."

Secretary of State James Baker issued that appeal-cum-warning to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee where hearings began Tuesday [23 June] on the START Treaty. When this treaty was signed in summer 1991 it was a bilateral treaty between the USSR and the United States. Now, however, as the secretary of state recalled, it has become a quadripartite treaty since three other nuclear powers—Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—became full parties to it.

But to judge from the questions put to Baker at the hearings, the Senate is not at all sure that the multilateral element is a plus and thinks that it might complicate the implementation of the treaty and the accompanying documents. Senator Joseph Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, drew attention to the fact that according to the Russian foreign minister's recent statement, Russia is not going to begin the process of ratifying the treaty until the three other partners affiliate to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. "I have serious doubts," the senator said, "whether Ukraine will keep its promise."

The Lisbon protocol left many things till later, to the future, Republican Richard Lugar remarked: The republics still have to agree among themselves on how the START Treaty is actually going to be fulfilled...But our committee, the senator went on, wants to be sure that after ratification the three republics will abide by international law regarding the observance of commitments under the treaty.

In the answers that Baker gave, admittedly, I heard nothing to completely dispel those doubts. Hence the assumption that efforts will be made in the Senate to "attach" an amendment to the START Treaty which would ask the republics, first and foremost Ukraine, to affiliate as soon as possible to the nonproliferation treaty. Senator Biden has already hinted transparently at the likelihood of such an amendment, which, if adopted, would undoubtedly complicate the ratification process and slow it down.

The situation could be complicated many times over. As the secretary of state said, it will take at best three or four weeks to produce the final version of the new treaty, envisaging the scrapping of our SS-18s and the reduction by more than half of America's sea-launched missiles, and at worst it will not be ready before 1 September.

September 1 will be too late for the present Senate to discuss and adopt the new treaty. Thus it will be necessary to wait for the general elections and for the new Senate to convene. When it does it will hardly tackle disarmament questions right away. Therefore, the ratification of the treaty which Bush and Yeltsin agreed cannot be expected before next spring.

Therefore you can understand the pressure that Baker applied to senators on the first day of the hearings. I have already mentioned the crucial argument which the secretary of state used: "Unless we ratify the START Treaty the uncertainty in the countries of the former Union will be exacerbated."

Other arguments were used: The Yeltsin-Bush treaty "is entirely meaningless without START"; "When START goes into force at least one delivery vehicle, including heavy bombers from the former Union's arsenal, will be scrapped every 68 hours for the next seven years"; "START will make it possible to end the long-standing and historical Soviet passion for secrecy regarding missile telemetry"; START certainly "does not curb the creation and deployment of nonnuclear military technologies, like, for example, conventional cruise missiles, whose effectiveness was demonstrated during the Persian Gulf war."

Cheney, Powell Testify

924P0152A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Jul 92 p 7

[ITAR-TASS report: "Red Light" for Missiles: The U.S. Defense Secretary Appeals to the Senate"]

[Text] U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and General Colin Powell, chairman of the Chiefs of Staff committee of the U.S. Armed Services, appealed to the Senate of the U.S. Congress for it to ratify the START Treaty as quickly as possible. It was concluded on 31 July last year in Moscow and provides for approximately a one-third reduction in the strategic arsenals of the United States and the CIS.

Speaking on Tuesday at the hearings on this issue in the Senate Armed Services Committee, Cheney observed that the START Treaty is a "first step in the process of strategic arms reduction" and creates a basis for the implementation of the framework accord on further reductions in strategic offensive arms reached at the June meeting of the presidents of the United States and Russia in Washington. "We need the START Treaty to be ratified immediately," the head of the Pentagon emphasized. Cheney also termed the accord on further reductions in strategic arms "an agreement of historic proportions, equaled in significance only by the START Treaty".

"We emphatically support the efforts of President Yeltsin and other leaders of the new independent states of the former Soviet Union geared to a strengthening of democratic reforms, which have begun to take root in their countries," the defense secretary said. "The transformation of Russia in this direction is clearly in our interests. And we will do everything we can to assist them in these efforts." But, according to Cheney, the United States must recognize the existence of the still powerful strategic nuclear forces which confront it and the fragility of the democratic practices in the states of

the former Soviet Union. For this reason the United States must retain a dependable nuclear deterrent force.

The head of the military department supported a continuation of nuclear testing. Considering the planned significant reductions in the number of warheads, it will be even more important to ensure that the remaining nuclear arms be as safe and dependable as possible. I call on members of the committee and the Congress to refrain from the imposition of additional limitations on nuclear testing, Cheney declared.

General Powell observed in his speech that the START Treaty signifies the start of a new era in international relations and insistently called on the Senate to ratify it. The framework agreement on further strategic arms reductions also, according to him, is a new "historic step forward." The START Treaty and the agreement reached at the summit in Washington should give the Russians every reason to consider themselves just as secure as we are, Powell emphasized.

Commentaries on Framework Arms Cut Agreement

U.S. First-Strike Capability Assessed

PM3006100592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Jun 92 p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev "Military Observer's Notes": "Why Does the United States Need First-Strike Weapons?"]

[Text] So, the experts have embarked on an analysis of the Russian-American strategic arms agreements signed in June. Their common theme is that the new accords with the United States can only strengthen Russian security. Very possibly. A state's security must not rely solely, of course, on military might, but nonetheless....

Judging by accounts from Washington, during the Russian-American summit U.S. representatives talked a great deal about our being allies and partners henceforth. However, words are one thing—deeds are more important. How can you regard Russia as a partner and ally and, at the same time, seek military superiority over it? I believe the framework accord on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments is indicative in this respect. In fact, according to it, the Americans keep their first-strike weapons while depriving Russia of the right to have the Russian RS-20 (SS-18) missile, which is the most effective and the least vulnerable after launch and which can be a stabilizing factor.

Let us analyze the military-technical aspect of the agreement, leaving aside for a moment the emotions over what has been achieved. First, the two sides' strategic offensive weapons.

Russia: On 31 July 1991 (at the time of the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty between the

USSR and the United States—the sides exchanged official data at the time) the home [otechestvennyy] strategic potential comprised 1,398 ICBM's, 321 of them mobile. There are eight types of ICBM's in service [v boyevom stroyu] even now. The RS-10, RS-12, and RS-12M multiple warhead ICBM's and five types of MIRVed ICBM's. They include the RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, and RS-22—stationary and mobile. The RS-20 (SS-18) and RS-22 (SS-24), with a range of 11,000 and 10,000 meters [as published], respectively, each carries 10 warheads. There was a total of 6,212 warheads deployed on ICBM's.

Now for our navy's strategic weapons. There are 940 ballistic missiles with 2,804 nuclear warheads deployed on 62 ballistic-missile submarines [SSBN]. Some 38 SSBN's of seven classes are registered at Northern Fleet bases (Nerpichya, Yagelnaya, Olenya, Ostrovnoy) and 24 SSBN's at Pacific Ocean Fleet bases (Rybachi, Pavlovskoye). The largest number of submarines is in the Murena class—18, each of them having 12 launchers with a launch range of 9,100 km. It is the Tayfun and Delfin SSBN's that are the most formidable. The six existing Tayfuns, each with 20 launchers, carry 1,200 warheads (RSM-52 missile with 10 warheads). The seven Delfin SSBN's can launch 448 warheads with a range, like the Typhoon, of 8,300 km.

The air force has 162 heavy bombers—Tu-95MS, Tu-95M, Tu-95K, Tu-95K22, and the modern Tu-160. Some 99 of them are equipped with air-launched nuclear cruise missiles.

By mid-1991 we had a total of 2,500 strategic delivery vehicles, with 10,271 warheads deployed on them.

United States: The Pentagon possesses 1,000 land-based ICBM's. This number includes 50 MX missiles, each with 10 warheads, 450 Minuteman-2 missiles, each with two warheads, and 500 Minuteman-3 missiles, each with three warheads. Let us note that 550 of the 1,000 missiles are MIRVed. Some 2,450 warheads in all.

The most powerful and least vulnerable component in a first strike is the naval component. The United States has 672 missiles at sea (all MIRVed) and 5,760 warheads, which is 54.5 percent of the total. The foundation is 18 (let me emphasize, 18) Trident nuclear submarines, each carrying 24 nuclear missiles with eight independently targeted reentry vehicles.

The Americans also possess 574 bombers, over 160 of which are equipped for launching cruise missiles. They carry 2,353 nuclear warheads.

There was a total of 2,222 delivery vehicles and 10,371 warheads in the United States.

A small explanation is needed here. The Russian potential should not be regarded as synonymous with the potential of the USSR. The land and air components have been divided among four republics. Only 81 percent of the strategic offensive armaments are on Russian

territory. In particular, there are RS-22 (SS-24) ground-mobile ICBM's in Belarus. Some 104 heavy missiles are deployed in Kazakhstan. These weapons are controlled from Moscow at the moment. As for the 176 silo-based ballistic missiles and their launchers and 48 strategic bombers stationed in Ukraine, well....Kiev has taken practical steps to nationalize strategic weapons. A long-range aviation grouping was set up in May under the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. The grouping's nuclear-armed units remain only operationally subordinate to the commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Strategic Forces.

That is what Russia and the United States took with them to the Washington meeting. During the meeting the sides agreed to reduce the total number of warheads from 21,000 to 6,000-7,000 by 2003 at the latest. Each side will be left with between 3,000 and 3,500. Moreover, each side will decide the structure of its own strategic forces within the aforementioned limits. At the first stage of cuts (by 1999) the United States will be left with 4,250 nuclear warheads and Russia will be left with 3,800—1,200 warheads on land-based missiles, including 650 on heavy missiles, and 2,160 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). At the second stage of cuts a limit of 3,500 warheads is set for the United States and 3,000 for Russia by 2000 (or 2003). Land-based MIRVed ICBM's are eliminated completely. A limit of 1,750 warheads is set for sea-launched missiles.

At first glance what you have is a bilateral removal of weapons stocks: The number of warheads is being cut several times over. However, if the United States intends to regard Russia as a partner in the future then why try to impose such an unequal agreement on it? Why keep its own first-strike weapons and deprive the other side of them? There is yet another aspect that should be mentioned here.

At the moment the Americans are working hard to involve Russia in "joint" work to establish a system that provides protection against a nuclear ballistic missile strike (this accord was reached between the presidents). The Pentagon does not disguise the fact that its creation will mean overstepping the bounds of the 1972 ABM Treaty, which for a long time was seen as the basis of the entire arms control system. By signing the START Treaty on 31 July 1991, the USSR made certain concessions, compensating for them with an important condition—that the United States continue to observe the demands of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Experts claim (the objective data are hardly likely to change in a few months) that deep cuts in strategic offensive armaments are impossible without banning the creation and deployment of an extensive ABM system.

What prompted this conclusion? During the preparation of the treaty it became clear that in time, the Americans would be capable of creating impenetrable global antimissile defenses, employing the latest technology. Specialists note that by 2000-2005 the Strategic Defense

Initiative would possess the real possibility of intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles during launch or in other segments of the trajectory. The still first-generation single-warhead ICBM's which remain in the Russian arsenal and are not designed to penetrate ABM defenses lose their effectiveness because in a retaliatory strike they are ideal targets for antimissile missiles.

That is why the task was set of retaining the ABM Treaty. However, if the creation of global strategic defense leads to the abolition of the treaty, then you will have, in Russia, missile targets for Brilliant Pebbles antimissile missiles, and, in the United States, reliable protection (Russia is simply unable to create it) and first-strike weapons.

The Americans saw the Russian RS-20 (SS-18) missiles with its 10 warheads as posing the greatest danger to them and all the time they have tried to get our state to abandon this type of missile. Last year's 31 July START Treaty envisages a 50-percent cut—from 308 to 154 over a period of seven years. But by 2003 only single-warhead missiles will remain on Russian territory. True, the United States is also eliminating all its 50 MX Missiles, each with 10 warheads (at Reagan's suggestion the MX was called "peacekeeper," but the RS-20 was denied the epithet for some reason). The number of warheads on the Minuteman-3 missile will be cut from three to one and the Minuteman-2 missile will be eliminated.

However, the naval strategic offensive armaments component was always the strongest in the United States, and it retains its superiority. As we noted earlier, a limit of 1,750 warheads has been set for sea-launched missiles. Equality on paper, but only on paper. The United States will keep all its 18 latest Trident missile submarines (the number of warheads on the systems could be cut)—a first-strike weapon. Russia has only six missile submarines of a similar class (Tayfun). The bulk of our submarine fleet (out of a total of 62) is obsolescent boats which were launched in the seventies (Navaga, Murena, Kalmar). So most of them are at bases, being refitted, with little more than 20 percent at their stations. Without any agreements at all, this percentage will decrease (defense, including repair, enterprises are in decline). By the year 2000 you could have a situation where our entire strategic fleet is in dock, thus losing its invulnerability.

The Washington accords only marginally touch on the airborne strategic offensive armaments component. The United States has a clear advantage here. U.S. strategic aviation comprises 574 heavy bombers with 2,353 nuclear warheads (22.3 percent of the total in the United States) compared with the 162 heavy bombers of the former USSR with 355 nuclear warheads (8.3 percent of the total), but there is more to it even than the figures. The United States is hastily modernizing its strategic air force. It is planned to incorporate "invisible" B-2 aircraft, using Stealth technology, in the arsenal. It is true that on 28 January G. Bush stated that the United States

is abandoning full-scale implementation of the B-2 construction program. Nonetheless 15-20 aircraft will be commissioned, and it is a first-strike weapon.

What about Russia? The latest home bomber is the Tu-160 (Blackjack), which is capable of carrying the RKV-500B cruise missile. The entire complement of these aircraft remains in Ukraine, and it is already clear that it will not be returned to Russia. The Russian Defense Ministry stopped producing the Tu-160 and Tu-95 at the end of January. In short, the home air force is left with aircraft which first entered service in 1956. They will become more venerable with each passing year.

Moreover, there is no mention at all in the framework agreement reached in Washington of nuclear-armed long-range cruise missiles—both the sea and air launched varieties. Yet it is well known that the United States has superiority in this type of weapon.

The following must also be said. The United States retains first-strike weapons, while we see gaps appearing in our defensive weapons systems, which, as in the United States, operate in tandem with deterrent weapons. The missile attack warning system, for example, is not in very good shape. Here again the reasons are purely internal. The long-range radar stations, situated on the perimeter of the country, are located in several sovereign states. One is in Latvia, two are in Ukraine. The construction of a radar station near Mukachevo was halted owing to a local protest. The existing station's functions are limited....

What I have said above suggests the following conclusion. The United States is striving to retain its superiority in the strategic offensive arms sphere in order to maintain in the future its status as a superpower—the world's only superpower—and to be able to continue to pursue its position-of-strength policy with even greater vigor.

Controversy Over Agreement Viewed

LD2806192892 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2310 GMT 27 Jun 92

[Valentin Zorin commentary]

[Text] The outcome of the recent summit between Presidents Boris Yeltsin and George Bush in Washington has evoked a mixed response in Russia.

The new strategic arms deal between Moscow and Washington has come under attack in Russia—the most bitter of its kind within a living memory. Some leading politicians and newspapers in Moscow describe the agreement as being little short of unconditional surrender, and President Yeltsin's betrayal of Russia's national interest. Its critics deliberately simplify their argument to drive home the unpleasant truth on the ground. They say that by disclaiming its land-based ICBM SS-20 missiles, which have long been the main element of military parity

between the two powers, and yet allowing the Americans to retain their sea-based missiles and other weapons, Russia has now rendered itself defenseless in the face of a U.S. military threat after tipping the balance reached at huge effort and cost.

Still others who welcome the deal say it meets the realities of the day. And some even say, Dr. Arbatov among them, that the two presidents didn't go far enough because the ceilings they set are still far in excess of what is often described as defense sufficiency.

However, there are many who don't think Mr. Yeltsin has done anything wrong to justify the charges of surrender to Washington. By agreeing to an unprecedented disarmament move he proceeded above all in this country's national interest and would never have put his seal of approval where national security came under threat.

With neither side threatening each other anymore the new agreement thrashes out what is widely known as a new thinking—a policy that was taken off the ground a few years ago. On the other hand some American decision making causes suspicion by the critics of the new agreement. If the U.S. Administration preaches the same ideas as Russian leaders, it would be hard to explain why its next year's defense budget runs at a staggering \$289 billion, or Washington's continued insistence to go ahead with its nuclear testing. Other questions also arise—many of them justified.

As Mr. Reagan used to say, it takes two to tango. In the meantime Washington must produce a strong argument of its good will so that the Russian leadership's bold move could win support from the Russian public and legislators. If not, the Washington agreements are likely to run against difficulties in this country.

'World This Week' Addresses Strategic Arms Cuts LD2806132492

[Editorial Report] Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian at 1030 GMT on 28 June carries a 29-minute edition of its "International Review: The World This Week" program, hosted by Vladimir Pasko.

Other program participants include: Igor Surguchev, one of Pasko's colleague; and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Aleksandrovich Berdennikov.

The program begins with Pasko reviewing the week's events, highlighting the Istanbul meeting on Black Sea cooperation, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's statement on the Dniester conflict, the Russian-Ukrainian summit in Dagomys, the agreement between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Georgian State Council Chairman Eduard Shevardnadze on South Ossetia, and the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Berdennikov discusses the Israeli general election.

At 1045 GMT, Berdennikov reviews the strategic arms reductions agreed at the recent U.S.-Russian summit.

There will be sharp reductions in strategic weapons on both sides, he notes, adding that the reduction in land-based multiple-warhead ICBMs will promote greater stability. The concept of striving for parity was used to justify the arms race in the past, Berdennikov says, before concluding that a balance of security, rather than a balance of arms, is needed.

At 1055 GMT, Pasko cites figures illustrating how the numbers of missiles in the United States and in Russia have been greatly reduced in recent years. Nevertheless, there are quite a few opponents of demilitarization moves both in the United States and in Russia, he points out, before concluding that there is a need to push on and take advantage of the present opportunities for reductions.

U.S., Russian Experts Discuss Warhead Options

*LD2906163192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1607 GMT 29 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow June 29 TASS—A group of businessmen representing U.S. leading nuclear power engineering firms met with Russian governmental officials on Monday [29 June] to discuss ways for utilising nuclear warheads to be destroyed under the U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reduction treaty.

The group is led by Max Kampelman, former head of the U.S. delegation at the disarmament talks in Geneva. The meeting was also attended by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The sides discussed ways to use enriched uranium extracted from dismantled warheads as fuel for nuclear power plants. Yuriy Osipov, president of the Russian Academy of Sciences, said concrete results can be expected early next year provided the sides sign a final agreement this autumn.

Kampelman believes Russia could greatly benefit from the project, adding, however, that this is only an idea which has yet to be translated into concrete projects.

Nuclear Conference Considers Weapons Destruction

*LD2906211392 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1900 GMT 29 Jun 92*

[Report by correspondent A. Peslyak on the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] In the environs of Moscow nuclear secrets are being revealed to us Russians. Parliamentarians of the North Atlantic Assembly and of Russia, military men and scientists from the countries of NATO, the Baltics and the CIS are discussing the problems of the dismantling and the nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons of the former USSR.

But how can the West help? Twenty-seven thousand warheads were stored in Union arsenals; 100,000 people in 10 closed towns were creating nuclear death. Now only 500 Russian experts are capable of ensuring the dismantling of 1,500-2,000 warheads per year. But that also requires enormous outlays. According to the Bush-Yeltsin agreement on radical CIS cuts, the outlays will quadruple. The fears of ecologists are also growing with half of our nuclear submarines being put out of action. It is best for everyone without missiles. This engenders the need for multilateral monitoring and management. [video shows partially submerged submarine, meeting and Peslyak interview with participant captioned as "M. Walters, NATO nuclear planning sector"]

[Begin Walters recording] A special group for CIS nuclear armaments has been set up in NATO. Our sounding of the alarm due to the proliferation of the atom has given way to satisfaction with a serious, responsible approach on the part of the Commonwealth and the Russian Government. [end recording]

'Disproportionate' Cuts Under Framework Agreement Viewed

*924P0147A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Jul 92 p 2*

[Article by Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov: "The United States and Russia: The 'Two-Thirds Arms Cut'—Is It Just in the Figures? More Likely, It's in Structural Changes"]

[Text] In Andrey Kozyrev's emotional and sincere—albeit not indisputable in all respects, in my opinion—interview with IZVESTIYA, I was struck by his statement that the United States, which before "wouldn't even hear of the possibility of reducing the naval component (the most important one) of its nuclear forces," now seems to have agreed to cut it by two-thirds. And the thing that bothers me isn't even the inappropriate, off-handed jibe at the "Gorbachev era." What bothers me is the "two-thirds."

Our press has published general information on the limits on delivery vehicles and warheads agreed to at the Washington summit. American sources are more generous with the details. The following picture emerges from a report released by the authoritative U.S. Congressional Research Service (which provides American legislators and their aids with reports and analytical materials) on the very day after the joint statement on strategic arms cuts was signed.

If the provisions of the June joint statement can be turned into an agreement binding on its participants, the Americans will be left with 2,160 warheads at sea in the first stage of implementing the reductions and 1,728 warheads in the second stage, with the same 432 launchers agreed to under last year's Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty—the legacy, so to speak, of

the "Gorbachev era." On our side, the two stages envision the maintenance of equal levels, substantially lower than the current ones, of warheads distributed among submarine-launched ballistic missiles of two types (under the terms of the START Treaty, we would have had one more type of submarine-launched ballistic missile, and hence the quantitative indices would have been somewhat higher).

If one is to believe the report, then where the American side is concerned, one can speak of a two-thirds cut in sea-launched warheads only in comparison with the situation at the moment preceding the START Treaty's entry into force, while launchers are reduced by one-third and their number does not drop below the level stipulated in the treaty.

In general, these are subtleties that are understood by professionals, who know not only the figures but also the "iron" behind them. I am prepared to consider myself to be an interested amateur. But even an uninitiated observer can't help but notice that the naval component of our own nuclear forces is being reduced to an incomparably smoother way [plavno] than our land-based weapons, which—again, if one is to believe the report—are to be reduced by more than two-thirds in terms of delivery vehicles and by more than 17 times in terms of warheads, if we compare the result with the situation prior to the START Treaty. It turns out, then, that our strategic force structure that has been shaped over the years is to be subjected to a fundamental reordering. Not to mention the fact that under the new plan for reductions, we will be left with less than 100 of the turboprop bombers whose photographs have been familiar to my peers since school age. This attests anew to the talent of A.N. Tupolev, who developed such a long-lived aircraft, but it hardly attests to its ability to deal with modern tasks in a way that meets modern requirements. Meanwhile, our country has given up future plans to build the advanced Tu-160 bomber, and the ones that have already been built are suddenly abroad—in Ukraine.

For the Americans, by contrast, the reductions will take place without a significant reshaping of the ratio among the components of their strategic forces. Moreover, with the sole exception of the new MX missile and, in part, the B-1B bomber (it has been decided to leave 79 of them, and not 97, as would have been the case under the START Treaty), all other delivery vehicles slated for reduction are already old and would have been retired in one way or another.

If, on the other hand, the report should not be believed in all respects, then one must at any rate take into account the fact that the opinions of American legislators on the threshold of ratification of the future agreement will be influenced by these kinds of materials.

The fewer weapons, the more calm, that's beyond doubt. But I would really like it if I and other conscientious skeptics were to be convinced that a change in our strategic "triad" that includes not only the elimination of

some delivery vehicles and reductions in warheads on others, but also a change in our infrastructure, financing, and so on—that this is economically expedient; that dismantling missiles and launchers is cheaper than removing excess warheads from them; that the consequences of a sudden forswearing of the construction of new systems will be limited to military production and will not affect basic and applied research in the civilian sector; and that an aircraft that has carried nuclear weapons for more than 30 years is not going to start regularly dropping out of the sky for the next 10.

In conclusion, two quotes. In an interview on CNN, President Bush, seeking to justify the clear disproportion in cuts of strategic forces, said that the "United States will continue to bear global responsibility for maintaining peace throughout the world, and I think that this will be an incommensurate responsibility." I don't understand what role a missile submarine can play in restoring and maintaining peace, say, in Yugoslavia.

At the Russian and American Presidents' joint press conference on June 16, the following question was asked: "Could you explain to those who might not understand why it is that friends who trust each other and do not intend to attack each other need 7,000 warheads?" In response, Bush said, among other things: "Who knows what lies out there ahead?"

SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

Prospects for Space-to-Earth Weapons

924P0146A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian
No 6, Jun 92 (Signed to press 08 May 92) pp 30-42

[Article by Aleksandr Alekseyevich Pikayev, scientific associate at the Russian Academy of Sciences IMEMO [Institute of World Economics and International Relations]: "Offensive Space Weapons: Threats and Reality"]

[Text] The 27 September 1991 initiative of President G. Bush confirmed the American administration's intention to continue the realization of strategic defense programs, even under conditions of radical and rapid reductions in strategic offensive weapons. In the new geopolitical situation, this intention is dictated primarily by the risk of the future emergence of small nuclear states, which may prove to be unpredictable and dangerous. This directionality gives the administration's plans a more realistic nature, since the future anti-missile system will be opposed not by tens of thousands of Soviet nuclear warheads, but only by tens and even the singular units of primitive systems held by third countries.

Washington's September proposal served not only as a stimulus for stirring debates in Moscow on the entire set of problems of strategic defense and space weapons, but also redirected these debates into a new channel which

differs radically from the manner in which they proceeded in the mid-80's. Joint development of a limited system of antiballistic-missile (ABM) defense with the United States reflects widespread sentiments regarding the need for qualitatively expanding cooperation with the West. It also presents a unique chance for the military-space establishment to retain its economic and political positions. From a purely military viewpoint, a limited ABM defense system cannot help but seem attractive also to those in Russia who fear the nuclear ambitions of former USSR republics.

Evidently, the indicated notions have also determined a radical review of the Russian leadership's official position regarding the entire set of problems associated with space weapons and with adherence to the ABM Treaty. This was reflected in President Yeltsin's televised statement to the people of Russia on 29 January 1992, as well as in his speech presented to the UN Security Council meeting on 31 January 1992.

On one hand, the president stressed Russia's intention to continue to adhere to the limitations set forth in the permanent Soviet-American ABM Treaty signed in 1972, which specifically prohibits the placement of anti-missile weapons in space. Moreover, it was proposed that any prototypes of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems held by the United States and the Commonwealth states which have not been thoroughly tested be done away with, i.e., that the world's only existing prototypes of space weapons be rejected.

On the other hand, the president proposed the joint development with the United States of a global system of defense against nuclear missile attack. The deployment of such a system on a global scale would contradict the principles of the ABM Treaty and its Protocol of 1974, which limits the placement of antiballistic missile defense to one area of deployment for each of the parties—around Moscow and around the American ICBM base at Grand Forks, North Dakota. In this way, Russia for the first time in fact announced its readiness to review the treaty at some time in the future in exchange for Washington's agreement to large-scale cooperation with Moscow in the sphere of strategic defense programs.

There has been an obvious cardinal change in the official course of the Kremlin, which before invariably rejected not only any opportunity to review the ABM Treaty, but also all efforts by the American side to broadly interpret a number of its principles. At the same time, the points of the president's speeches on the elimination of ASAT systems and adherence to the ABM Treaty hardly represent merely ritual curtseys whose purpose is to soften in the eyes of public opinion the all too sharp turn in policy. Most likely, they testify to the fact that a final decision has not yet been adopted, and that its character will be determined by Washington's reaction as well as by the outcome of debates within Russia.

Thus, although the outcome of the debates is not yet predetermined either in Russia or in the United States, it is already clear that for the first time in history the proponents of deployment of large-scale anti-missile systems have better chances for victory. The end of the "cold war," the disintegration of the USSR, and the significant progress achieved in the sphere of limiting and reducing weapons have not only not shaken, but have even strengthened their positions.

The new start for strategic defense has inevitably also revived the old fears that large-scale NIOKR [scientific-research and experimental design work] on developing defensive weapons will give a strong impetus also to the development of their technical doubles—offensive space weapons: Anti-satellite systems (ASAT) and "space-to-Earth" systems (SKZ).

As for ABMs, rather close attention has been given to them by the international as well as the Soviet academic community. However, "space-to-Earth" systems, in the opinion of most experts, are represented by weapons whose practical deployment, at least in the next few decades, is rather improbable.

Nevertheless, the possible development of "space-to-Earth" systems as a result of the realization of anti-satellite and anti-missile programs occupied an important place in the Soviet argumentations at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) with the United States in Geneva, directed against the review of the ABM Treaty. Here the question of the practical and strategic expediency of adopting such systems into the arsenal found a rather modest place on the pages of scientific publications, which sometimes made it possible to overdramatize the problem of SKZ systems, appealing to the psychologically understandable fears regarding weapons which constantly "hang" overhead. This article is an effort to fill this void.

EVOLUTION AND SPECIFICS OF THE CONCEPT OF 'OFFENSIVE SPACE WEAPONS'

The concepts of "space weapons," "offensive" or "strike" space weapons, "object in space" and "space object", and the difference between "offensive" and "defensive" systems, bear a rather conditional character. Moreover, in various years, depending on the political situation, entirely different types of weapons were understood under each of these terms.

This relates primarily to the term, "space weapons," whose interpretation, like the official Soviet position on this question, including also at the Soviet-American NST, underwent significant changes. As early as 1982, the second edition of the brochure published by the USSR Ministry of Defense, "Whence the Threat to Peace," did not even contain the concept of "space weapons." Anti-satellite systems were referred to there as "active means for defeating space objects" and were related to "anti-space defense" (PKO). Work on developing means of anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM), although it was mentioned along with PKO, was not

viewed as a component part of the latter. Manned space shuttles were understood to be potential "space strike systems." It was stated that various means of reconnaissance and elimination of space targets were being "developed" for installation on these shuttles. There was also no mention of the threat of using weapons from space against targets on Earth and in the atmosphere.

The next edition, which was published in 1984, already mentioned plans for creating "effective means of eliminating targets in space, and from space—in the atmosphere and on Earth." The term, "space strike system," disappeared. Instead of it there appeared a new name—"strike means," which presumed not the shuttles, but systems "whose primary task is becoming the destruction of spacecraft," i.e., ASAT. However, the potential "all-encompassing" ABM, as before, was distinguished from the "space-based strike weapons." The term "space strike weapons" began to be understood more broadly only after the start of the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST). The Soviet proposals forwarded to the 40th Session of the UN General Assembly in August of 1985 pointed out that "actions are being taken aimed at the development and deployment of space strike weapons for destroying objects in space and from space in the air and on land, including the development of a large-scale antiballistic missile system with space-based elements." Subsequently, work in the sphere of ABM was again distinguished from the concept of "space weapons," while the space-based echelons of a potential anti-missile system began to be called strike weapons in space.

At the present time, any means of destruction located in space and/or intended for destroying a space object (from space as well as from land) are related to space weapons. Weapons capable of destroying a weapon in space are not considered to be space weapons. It seems, however, that this definition also has some serious shortcomings.

How does a "space object" differ, for example, from an "object in space?" Although a significant part of a ballistic missile's flight occurs in space, under such an approach it does not act in the role of a space object, since it is not intended for permanent placement in orbit. But here another question immediately arises: Where is the boundary between permanent and temporary placement in orbit? Any satellite, which is synonymously related to space objects, functions for a finite period of time, sometimes only for a few hours. On the other hand, partially orbital missiles were being developed, which were to complete almost an entire orbit around the Earth. We may, of course, distinguish a space object from an object in space by the principle of whether it makes more or less than one orbit around the Earth. But, strictly speaking, a full orbit was not performed even during the first manned space flight. Yu. Gagarin landed several hundred kilometers west of the launch site.

This problem certainly has more than just scholastic importance. A weapons system intended for destroying a

space object may be tested against a pre-orbital target, i.e., an object in space. This means that up until the actual combat application this system can juridically not be related to space weapons, and in general does not fall under the various international legal limitations on space weapons.

The international-legal regimen does not define the concept of "weapon" or "arms." Yet in all the treaties on limitation and reduction of arms, the discussion centers around specific systems. Thus, the object of the Strategic Arms Reduction [START] Treaty is not simply strategic offensive arms, but actually existing systems of weapons: Strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, etc. However, operating in such nebulous formulations as "space weapons" presents an entire series of difficult problems. Thus, can a laser, which does not destroy a satellite physically but which puts it out of commission, for example by "blinding" its optic sensors, be considered a weapon? Or a mirror placed in orbit and intended for redirecting the beam from a ground laser?

It is a no less difficult task to identify offensive and defense arms. In different circumstances, the same weapons system may act as a defensive or offensive one. For example, if the information from a reconnaissance satellite is used to prepare for aggression, it should be classed as an offensive weapon. If, however, its data are used by the defending side, then this same satellite now acts as a defensive system.

'SPACE-TO-EARTH' SYSTEMS: CERTAIN HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL-LEGAL ASPECTS

As early as 1967-1971, the Soviet Union performed testing of a partially orbital missile which was to have been placed into orbit from the territory of the USSR, make an incomplete orbit around the Earth over the South Pole, and could strike at the United States from the southern direction. At that time, the United States did not have an early warning missile detection system oriented toward the south. Subsequently, with the construction of a southern-oriented early warning system, as well as for a number of technical considerations, this system was dismantled.

The absence of "space-to Earth" systems within the arms arsenal at the present time is explained not by some limitations of an international-legal character, but by the absence of a military-technical need for their development. The existing international-legal regimen for limiting and reducing arms contains no guarantees which could prevent the development of space-to-Earth systems. Thus, Article 2(3) of the UN Charter, which presents the obligations of states to refrain from application of force in their relations with each other, places certain legal barriers to the application of such systems. At the same time, Article 51 of the Charter, which speaks of the right of states to self defense, in principle allows their application for defensive purposes.

The 1963 Treaty on banning testing of nuclear weapons in three environments does not allow the testing of nuclear space-to-Earth systems in space, while the 1967 Treaty on the principle of using space for peaceful purposes prohibits the deployment of nuclear systems in orbit. Moreover, in accordance with Article 4 of the 1967 Treaty, "the development of military bases, structures and fortifications, the testing of any types of weapons and holding military maneuvers on heavenly bodies is prohibited." This principle does not extend to open space. The 1967 Treaty also does not contain any procedures for verification, and thereby does not hinder the possible hidden placement of nuclear space-to-Earth systems in orbit, and other types of these systems on the heavenly bodies.¹

Article 9 of the Soviet-American Salt II Agreement contained the obligations of the parties "...not to develop, not to test and not to deploy... means of putting nuclear weapons or any other types of mass destruction weapons into orbit around the Earth, including partially orbital rockets."² However, in 1986 the United States announced the cessation of their adherence to this agreement. Such a formulation was also not included in the START Treaty of 1991.

Article 3 of the ABM Treaty prohibits the placement of ABM systems or their components beyond the limits of the area stipulated in the article. In Article 1 the parties promise "not to deploy ABM systems on the territory of their country and not to create a basis for such defense." Article 5 contains the obligation "not to develop, not to test, and not to deploy ABM systems or components which are sea, air, space, or mobile-land based."³ Thus, the Treaty, although it does not contain a direct prohibition or limitation of "space-to-Earth" systems, on at least three occasions places certain obstacles in the path of their creation by means of development of anti-missile technology within the framework of strategic defense programs.

The manifestation of the concern in the Soviet Union regarding the problem of space-to-Earth systems has coincided in time (and this is evidently no accident) with the peak of debates over SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. In the 80's, Moscow expressed for the first time at an official level its concern regarding the prospect that the orbital deployment of elements of a large-scale ABM system would lead to the creation of "space-to-Earth" systems. Specifically, M. S. Gorbachev announced: "The American side does not want to admit that SDI is a plan for bringing weapons into space. But these are weapons. They will fly—American and Soviet weapons—in waves over people's heads. All of us will look up at such a sky and wait for what might fall from it."⁴

A number of Soviet researchers of that period also did not exclude the principle possibility of utilizing anti-missile space systems against land and air targets. Thus, one of the speeches of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat noted that the "direct result of the deployment of

large-scale anti-missile defense with space-based elements will be, first of all, the appearance of new previously nonexistent capacities for destroying the enemy's guidance and communications systems located on aircraft, as well as, possibly, certain types of land-based objects. Such a system... will lead to a new round in the nuclear arms race, although this time already in space, where a significant part of the offensive nuclear capability of both countries may be transferred."⁵

In the United States the capacities for creating "space-to-Earth" systems based on developments in the field of strategic defense were not reviewed either in the official administration documents regarding SDI, nor in the primary speeches of the program's critics. However, there were certain comments in which the prospects of using space-based anti-missile systems for purposes of SKZ were presented in an overly dramatic fashion. Moreover, the authors of these comments were the most fervent supporters of space weapons, as well as their active critics. One of the proponents of placing laser weapons into orbit, G. Razer, pointed out that "in 30 minutes, a strike from space would set back an industrially developed country to the level of the 18th Century." G. Kendall, who occupied the position of chairman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, one of the most influential opponents of SDI, warned that space lasers may be used, for example, for purposes of selectively killing high Soviet leaders on the Mausoleum Podium during the Mayday demonstrations.

The ideas which emerged in the mid-80's regarding the potential effectiveness of using space-based ABM systems which were being developed against ground targets, most likely did not reflect the real prognoses of the possible rapid emergence of SKZ, but were rather presented within the framework of broader debates for and against the development of strategic defense programs. The opponents of SDI tried to show that the practical deployment of large-scale anti-missile systems may lead to totally unpredictable results. However, the appearance in orbit of a nuclear or other "superweapon" of a potential enemy, constantly "hanging" overhead, was presented as a very psychologically effective argument which clearly demonstrated the danger of SDI.

We must note that as the dramatic presentation of the problem of SDI in the Soviet press was reduced and as the USSR's position in the negotiations on nuclear and space arms evolved in the direction of a more practical approach, the evaluations regarding "space-to-Earth" systems also changed. In one of the latest studies conducted under the aegis of the Committee of Soviet Scientists, the placement of nuclear weapons in space was already discussed as a rather probable consequence of the realization of strategic defense programs. It was pointed out only that the arms systems developed within the framework of SDI, from a purely technical viewpoint, may be used "...against objects not only in space, but also in the atmosphere and on the Earth's surface."⁶ Serious American studies also give a rather sceptical

appraisal of the suitability of space-based anti-missile systems as "space-to-Earth" weapons.

A similar tendency is seen also in Soviet initiatives on the question of space arms. In 1981 and 1983 the USSR submitted to the UN drafts of the Treaty on banning the placement of weapons of any kind in space (11 August 1981) and of the Treaty on banning the application of military force in open space and from space in relation to Earth (21 August 1983). While the 1981 draft did not contain any mention at all of "space-to-Earth" systems, the 1983 proposal, which in essence represented a reaction to President Reagan's announcement of the SDI program, already included a position on banning the placement and testing of weapons, including SKZ, not only on the heavenly bodies, but also in orbit. Yet this in fact merely expanded and clarified the differently worded formulation of Article 4 of the 1967 Treaty on banning the placement of military bases and tests of any types of weapons on the heavenly bodies. Moreover, the draft, like the 1967 Treaty, did not presuppose any other procedures of verification other than NTM [National-Technical Means].

The next major initiative—on immunity of space objects—was presented at the Conference on Disarmament in March of 1986, when the propaganda campaign surrounding SDI had somewhat died down. Once again, as in the 1981 draft, it said nothing about "space-to-Earth" systems.

SKZ ON NEW PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES: OBSTACLES OF A TECHNICAL CHARACTER

It is expedient to examine the potential effectiveness of "space-to-Earth" systems on new physical principles from two points of view. First of all, which of the types of weapons discussed within the framework of the strategic defense programs may be utilized as SKZ. And secondly, what surface objects are vulnerable to strikes from space and whose destruction by this method would meet cost-effectiveness criteria.

From a purely physical viewpoint, the atmosphere is practically impermeable to particle-beam weapons. When the ionization of a beam of neutral particles enters the atmosphere, it causes such significant dispersion that the primary destructive characteristic of the system—current density—drops by several orders. The method of gas focusing, in which the beam passes along an ionized corridor created by a laser, is effective only in dense layers of the atmosphere, and is extremely energy consumptive. The beam of charged particles must overcome part of the path through space from the combat orbital platform to its entry into the dense layers of the atmosphere, where it must also undergo strong dispersion which will make its further focusing impossible. "Thus," noted a Committee of Soviet Scientists study, "it seems unlikely that particle-beam weapons may be used against land and even aerial objects with any, even a low, degree of effectiveness."⁷

In certain wavelength ranges, the atmosphere is transparent to laser irradiation. However, it is not uniform, since it includes particles of dust and moisture, and air currents are in constant movement. These non-uniformities may be overcome with the aid of methods based on the application of adaptive optics and circulation of the wave front. And although the task of transmitting a beam from space to Earth is more complex than from Earth to space, it is believed that this problem can be solved. Another difficulty bears a more serious character. Dense cloudiness and smoke may be rather non-transparent to the laser beam. Especially important targets may be defended by a rather dense artificial smokescreen. Another extremely complex technical task is that of providing the laser with the energy necessary for overcoming the atmosphere. The nuclear-pumped X-ray laser, which is the most effective from the standpoint of energetics, cannot be used as an SKZ, because the dense layers of the atmosphere are non-transparent to radiation in the X-ray range. It is also unclear how the transparency of the atmosphere will change as a result of considerable increase in the air temperature along the line of distribution of the laser beam.

Kinetic-energy weapons in the form in which they are being developed at the present time within the framework of strategic defense programs are also practically unsuitable for destruction of land targets. The interceptors which are small in mass would simply burn up in passing through the atmosphere. Moreover, the kinetic system destroys by means of collision of colossal force. The energy of this collision is directly proportion to the square of the velocity of the interceptor. However, the atmosphere exerts a significant decelerating effect, while the high angle of entry into the atmosphere significantly increases the ballistic dispersion and reduces the accuracy of the space-based kinetic system. This difficulty could theoretically be overcome by means of equipping the system with homing sensors, but the excess heat emission upon entry into the atmosphere requires a rather effective sensor cooling system.

Hypothetically, it is possible to increase the mass of the interceptor in such a way that it does not burn up in the atmosphere, or to give it such a high initial speed which would ensure a collision energy sufficient to destroy the land-based object. However, this would place such high demands on the characteristics of the new interceptor and the orbital launcher that it would be equivalent to the creation of a principally new system. Its development may be conducted only within the framework of a new large-scale NIOKR program.

Destruction of a target in the upper layers of the atmosphere is a relatively easier task. Such targets may include high-flying combat aircraft. But there is another difficulty here. Kinetic weapons have lesser speed by five orders as compared with directed energy weapons. Therefore, the destruction of a moving target presents high demands for a self-guidance system. It is capable of reaching its target only several minutes after launch (depending on the altitude of the launch platform), while

a laser weapon destroys practically instantaneously. A supersonic bomber flies no less than 20 km a minute. Consequently, a minute after launch the kinetic energy weapon's homing system must scan an area of over 1,200 square kilometers, after two minutes—over 5,000, and after three minutes—already over 11,000 square kilometers.

From what we have said, it follows that land objects are theoretically and with numerous limitations vulnerable only to space-based lasers. However, the dependence of space lasers on weather conditions makes the effective planning of their application practically impossible—it is not known ahead of time whether the necessary target will be hidden under a cloud cover at the given time. This fact alone sharply hinders the application of SKZ as sudden attack weapons: A large-scale operation which requires thorough coordination of all, not only space-based, but also land-based forces and means, cannot be placed in dependence on the presence of clouds (not to mention other artificial means of covering) at "zero hour."

Laser weapons are in principle applicable for destroying easily flammable stationary objects with little protection, as for example oil processing and chemical plants, unprotected munitions and fuel-lubricant material warehouses, and tankers. If longer focusing or greater power of the laser beam is ensured, better protected objects may also prove to be vulnerable—radar stations (RLS) or aircraft at airfields. Heavy industry enterprises which do not contain explosive types of production, submarines in bases and seagoing ships are much less vulnerable to laser weapons. As for such heavily fortified strategic objects as ballistic missile silos, underground command posts, and nuclear weapons stockpiles, most of them are sufficiently protected so as to withstand the detonation of a nuclear warhead of a megaton class at a distance of several hundred meters. They are invulnerable to laser beams.

Hypothetically, space-based lasers are capable of causing combustion of structures made of fire retardant materials and starting fires in populated areas and military garrisons built up of these structures, as well as combustion of farm crops and forests, especially in hot, dry weather. However, from the standpoint of cost effectiveness, this would be an absurdly expensive endeavor. The expenditures for burning fields and hangars by means of a space-based laser would be several times greater than the loss inflicted upon the enemy. Moreover, there are also less exotic methods. Cities may be destroyed, and farm crops and fields poisoned with defoliants and burned with the aid of bomber aviation and sea-launched cruise missiles with standard weapons, not to mention nuclear means. The use of sabotage groups may also be rather effective.

The defense of mobile ground targets such as, for example, mobile ICBM launchers or mobile ground command posts, is comparable to that of the RLS. But here additional problems arise—detecting, and in the

case of mobile command posts their identification, as well as tracking of the target with a focused beam, if the capacity of the SKZ is insufficient for its destruction in an interval of time which makes it possible to ignore the speed of movement of the launcher or command post itself.

Aerial targets are more vulnerable, especially at high altitudes. The characteristics of the atmosphere are most favorable for passage of a laser beam at an altitude of over 20 km, and satisfactory—over 10 km, i.e., specifically where the main part of the flight of modern bombers and aerial command posts takes place. At altitudes over 20 km, they are vulnerable also to kinetic systems. Below the level of 10 km, there is a sharp increase in the concentration of microscopic inclusions and turbulence. However, the task of tracking an aircraft as compared with a ballistic missile may turn out to be more difficult. On one hand, the speed of the airplane is less, but on the other—the ballistic trajectory of the rocket is on the whole predictable, while it is impossible to predict the direction of flight of an airplane. For infrared sensors it is much more difficult to detect an aircraft as compared with the flare of a ballistic missile. Moreover, there are also no insurmountable obstacles to reducing the aviation flight altitude below 8-10 km, which would increase the fuel expenditure but at the same time would turn the space-based lasers into a rather unreliable means of destruction.

NUCLEAR 'SPACE-TO-EARTH' SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL EFFECTIVENESS AND STRATEGIC INEXPEDIENCY

Nuclear "space-to-earth" systems deserve a separate investigation. In passing through the atmosphere, nuclear SKZ delivery vehicles encounter the same series of obstacles as kinetic systems. However, they differ radically in their method of destruction of the target. While kinetic systems destroy the target by means of collision energy, nuclear systems destroy it by detonation of the nuclear warhead.

The nuclear explosion represents a more ruinous means of destruction for the present day. This allows nuclear "space-to-Earth" systems, unlike other SKZ, to destroy targets practically independently of the degree of their defense. Moreover, being placed on missiles, these systems are also free of many of the obstacles faced by SKZ in overcoming the atmosphere. There is a developed technology which makes it possible to prevent burnup of the missiles when passing through dense layers of the Earth's air blanket. Unlike kinetic systems, deceleration in the atmosphere does not have such a critical effect on the destructive capacity of nuclear SKZ. They do not require adaptive optics and do not depend on the status of the cloud cover, as do lasers. And finally, in a purely technical sense, as there is more progress in the sphere of heavy booster rockets and large-scale orbital stations, the placement of nuclear missile systems in orbit becomes more probable in a technical sense and within a shorter

time as compared with exotic types of weapons, many of which are still in the stages of NIOKR.

At the same time, "space-to-Earth" nuclear systems possess a most important relative advantage over other potential types of SKZ—minimal approach time. It is true, the warheads of space-based missiles will enter the atmosphere at a greater angle and, consequently, will prove to be less accurate as compared with their land-based analogs. However, with solution of the problem of self-guidance, missiles from orbit will be capable of destroying any ground targets with a minimal approach time. With a vertical missile speed component of around 5 km/sec, it will take slightly over three minutes to reach the Earth's surface from an altitude of 1,000 km.

Deployment of space-based echelons of large-scale ABM systems would create a principally new strategic situation and could give orbital nuclear weapons additional advantages. Nuclear weapons in space could be viewed as one of the rather valuable means of overcoming antiballistic missile defense. The extremely short approach time of nuclear forces based in space would seriously complicate the task of detection, targeting and tracking the target with the anti-missile system. Orbital basing of combat stations with nuclear weapons on board would make it possible to circumvent the ABM echelon intended for destroying the missile on the acceleration portion of its trajectory and would significantly increase demands for the interceptor echelon in space. Space-based missiles, having a greater angle of entry into the atmosphere as compared with ground-based missiles, spend less time in overcoming it. Upon entry into the atmosphere, there is a natural separation of true and false warheads. The false ones, being lighter, seem to lag behind in the air. The time interval between separation and reaching the target is set aside for terminal interception. For a land-based missile this time interval is greater, and consequently the terminal ABM has more time to identify, target and destroy its goal.

At the same time, the outward military-technical and operative attractiveness of nuclear SKZ certainly does not mean that their placement in orbit is expedient and quite probable. The application of one weapons system or another for specific purposes is determined by factors of a technical and strategic order, as well as by notions of cost effectiveness. Therefore, the prospect of nuclear "space-to-Earth" systems is determined not only by the purely technical capacity of destroying one ground target or another, but also by their relative advantages and shortcomings as compared with other types of weapons, and primarily land-based systems. Among criteria of this sort it is important to isolate, first of all, the viability, reliability, application readiness, approach time, accuracy, and certain other factors.

The application of this type of systems analysis leads to different conclusions than does the isolated review of the capabilities of nuclear SKZ. Specifically, in studying the entire sum of the above-listed factors, not only is the

attractiveness of nuclear SKZ lost, but their relative ineffectiveness as compared with existing strategic arms becomes apparent.

Due to the laws of astrodynamics, combat space stations cannot be located permanently over the same point of the Earth. Therefore, in order to constantly keep aim on the same target, it is necessary to have not one, but several stations alternating with each other. Consequently, for one target, a greater number of space-based means of destruction would be needed as compared with land-based means. Their number depends on a series of unknown parameters, and primarily on the altitude of the orbit. The higher the orbit, the greater part of the Earth's surface is within its field of vision. For example, from a geostationary orbit the entire planet with the exception of the polar regions (due to the peculiar form of the Earth's globe or, as it is otherwise referred to, the Earth's ellipsoid, which is flattened at the poles) may be covered by three satellites. But as the altitude increases, so does the approach time. Beginning at approximately 9,000 km, it may exceed the flight time of current ICBMs. The approach time of an SLBM may be even less—7-15 minutes (due to the possibility of launching the missiles near the enemy's shores, as well as flight along a low-angle trajectory), which is equivalent to an orbit with an altitude of approximately 2,000-4,000 km. Thus, in order to preserve the basic advantage of nuclear SKZ—a short approach time—they must be located on low orbits, which requires a large number of orbital combat stations and has a negative effect on such criteria as cost and vulnerability.

Most likely, orbital launch platforms for nuclear SKZ will be discernable from other space objects. The presence of nuclear weapons on board may be determined with the aid of a series of long-range methods which detect the warhead's radiation field. At the same time, the detection of important elements of the earth-based strategic triad—the SLBM on combat patrol, as well as the land-mobile ICBM en route, or the heavy bomber (HB) on air patrol—is at present an extremely difficult task.

Moreover, on Earth there are greater capacities for fortifying launch positions than there are in space. Land-based ICBM's in a shaft may be destroyed only by a high precision nuclear strike. Combat space stations move along predictable trajectories and are vulnerable to a broad spectrum of weapons. They may be destroyed by land-based anti-satellite systems (if the station is in a low orbit), or by space-based kinetic energy ASAT's. The space stations' sensors may be "blinded" by a laser beam, and its electronic apparatus may be put out of order by particle-beam weapons. There are no boundaries in space, and already in peacetime there may be a nuclear or non-nuclear "mine" near each combat station. Communications with space platforms (except laser) are vulnerable to means of radioelectronic counteraction. Finally, nuclear space forces require a global system of control and communications, including also on foreign territory. Scattered throughout various

regions of the world, the components of this system are especially vulnerable to enemy diversionary activity, as well as to acts of sabotage of local origin.

The reliability of space-based nuclear missiles is also relatively lower than that of land-based ones. Under conditions of growing pollution of the space surrounding the earth with various "space rubbish," an orbital combat station may be damaged, specifically, by a piece of a satellite which has ceased its activity, or by a meteorite. Space basing presupposes an immeasurably more complex and expensive system of operation than that of land-based nuclear forces, and this increases the possibility of accidents.

Control over the possible application of orbital nuclear forces is also significantly more complicated. Under conditions of a short approach time, the time for making the decision of a return or oncoming strike is also reduced. This may make it necessary to rely on high-speed computers, and to reduce to a minimum man's participation in making the launch decision. However, excessive reliance on computers increases the risk of an accidental launch of space missiles as a result of a technical malfunction. And on the contrary, an accident on an orbital combat complex or in a super-computerized control system which is not detected in time may hinder bringing the nuclear arsenal into action at the necessary moment.

Most likely, space-based combat platforms will be unmanned. The constant presence of man would be possible only with provision of a life support system, which would increase the station's dimensions, as well as its cost and vulnerability. However, the unmanned character of the orbital station would mean the application of long-range means of control over the launch of the nuclear weapon. This would complicate the system of control and communications, and would increase the probability of a malfunction. Moreover, a long-range control system would be dangerously dependent on the enemy's capacity for jamming the space platform's communications with Earth.

The more frequent replacement of space systems will require additional expenditures. Land-based types of nuclear weapons operate for 20-25 years, but as yet it has not been possible to prolong the service life of low-orbit satellites for more than a few years. This is hindered by a circumstance of a purely objective order: Near the Earth, the artificial earth satellite constantly comes into contact with atmospheric particles, and recently more and more also with waste products from man's activity. Operation will also be more expensive. On Earth a repair crew may simply go down into the silo in order to check the status of the missile or to perform routine maintenance, while to perform a similar operation in orbit, a much more expensive procedure is necessary—flight into space.

There is also the risk that, as the result of an accident, the heavy orbital platform with nuclear weapons on board

will not burn up in the atmosphere and will fall to Earth. Such precedents have already occurred with Soviet as well as with American space objects. In the course of falling or upon impact with Earth, radioactive and toxic elements may be emitted into the surrounding environment, which will lead to dangerous contamination of the area.

From the standpoint of strategic stability, space-based nuclear missiles are almost the worst possible variant. Practically all of their characteristics—short approach time, vulnerability and unreliability—are classic indicators of instability. The extremely short approach time leaves the other side almost no time to make a competent decision by the political leadership regarding response measures, does not allow it to evaluate the scope of the attack, and most likely, will force it to delegate authority on response either to the local controllers or to computers. This harsh time-trouble forces the opponent to rely on launch upon notification, and sharply increases the probability of error in making the decision of using nuclear forces. The considerable vulnerability makes the situation even worse. The accidental orbital collision of a combat space platform with some other product of anthropogenic activity, or simply with a meteorite, under conditions of an approach time which is numbered in minutes, creates a significant danger of false interpretation of the accident as a premeditated preventive action by the enemy, and may provoke a super-reaction, up to giving the order to use the remaining stations.

The destabilizing characteristics of nuclear SKZ evoke serious doubts as to whether the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit will be considered an effective practical countermeasure against space-based anti-missile system echelons. Such destabilizing characteristics of nuclear SKZ may fully force us to turn to less exotic means of counteraction: Launching ballistic missiles on low-angle trajectories, increasing the role of bombers or cruise missiles, placing a large number of false warheads in the head portion of ballistic missiles, or using a special salvo launch method, which seemingly punches "windows" in the ABM system. The deployment of active means of counteraction is also possible—anti-satellite systems and other types of anti-ABM weapons.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The low probability—and obvious inexpediency—of the emergence of "space-to-Earth" systems in the foreseeable future does not presently pose the question of creating an international-legal regime for their limitation and holding negotiations on this problem. At the present time, there is practically only one potential stimulus for placement only of nuclear SKZ: In case of deployment of space-based anti-missile weapons they could be viewed as an additional means of overcoming ABM systems at the initial segment of the ballistic missile's trajectory. However, here too the destabilizing characteristics which are inherent in "space-to-Earth" nuclear systems would make the process of making the decision of their

deployment in a combat complement extremely complex, and its outcome rather indefinite.

The signing of the START Treaty in 1991 placed on the agenda the question of developing the positions of the parties at the START-2 talks. It is also clear that, since the achieved Treaty contains no limitations on space weapons, this problem will again arise at the new talks in one degree or another. Under these conditions, it is necessary to review the priorities of our approach to the question of limiting space-based arms, and to give it a more realistic nature.

In this connection, we should reject excessive emphasis of attention on "space-to-Earth" systems. In general, it is unlikely that they may be the subject of such detailed negotiations as those which will continue on nuclear and space weapons. The absence of specific weapons systems does not allow us to develop detailed procedures for their limitation and verification. And the development of some general agreement on this subject would be a duplication of the already existing Treaty of 1967, which prohibits placement of nuclear weapons in orbit (and specifically, nuclear SKZ are technically more realistic). The excessive attention which the Soviets have given to futuristic and rather dubious "space-to-Earth" systems at key negotiations has distracted the parties from discussing the only actually existing and potentially rather dangerous type of space weapons—anti-satellite weapons.

The apprehensions regarding the appearance of nuclear "space-to-Earth" systems could be removed by strengthening the conditions of the Treaty of 1967. For these purposes, we could begin negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament on coordinating a supplemental protocol which would allow the participant countries to perform inspection of launch platforms and to implement detection of nuclear weapons on board a launched spacecraft by means of long-range methods. The effectiveness of long-range nuclear weapon detection methods was successfully demonstrated in the course of the joint Soviet-American experiment performed in 1989 on the Crimean shore. In the course of this experiment, the presence of nuclear weapons on board the Soviet cruiser "Slava" was established with the aid of sensors which were located at some distance from the cruiser.

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted from: "USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. USSR Struggle for Peaceful Use of Space. Documents and Materials in Two Volumes." Volume 2, M., 1985, pp 11-17.

2. Quoted from: "Disarmament and Security. 1987: IMEMO Annual," M., 1988, p 783.

3. Quoted from: Disarmament and Security. 1986: IMEMO Annual, "Vol 2, 1987, pp 196-198.

4. Quoted from: "USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. USSR Struggle for Peaceful Use of Space. Documents and Materials in Two Volumes," M., 1985, Vol 2, p 480.

5. "Large-Scale Anti-Missile System and International Security. Speech by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat (Brief Adapted Variant)," M., 1986, p 43.

6. "Space Weapons: Dilemma of Security," M., 1986, p 81.

7. "Space Weapons: Dilemma of Security," M., 1986, p 84.

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[Article by N.N. Moiseyev, Yu.N. Pavlovskiy, V.N. Tsygichko, and K.V. Cherevkov: "Ideas and Opinions: Instrument for a New International Security System"]

[Text] We are concluding our discussion of the letter by Academician N.N. Moiseyev (ZA RUBEZHOM, No 34, 1991), who proposed a plan for eliminating the danger of nuclear war through the creation, under the UN aegis, of a space-based missile defense system. The editors express their sincere gratitude to all the discussion's participants.

Articles by politicians, prominent scientists, and military specialists of our country and the United States were published within the framework of the discussion. Unfortunately, we were unable to publish all the articles that were sent to us, since the proposals contained in them were in large part already put forward by other authors or were of a purely military-technical character.

As regards the results of the discussion, three basic conclusions can be drawn from it, in our opinion. The first conclusion is that the problem of eliminating the nuclear threat must be solved at the level of the entire world community. It would be desirable to do this in an integrated fashion, to work to solve the problem in conjunction with other crucial problems—not just political and military ones, but also economic, social, and ecological problems. The second conclusion is that a very great deal depends on the ability of Russia as the successor to the former USSR—one of the two nuclear "superpowers"—to play an active role in these efforts. And since at present and in the near future, it can make its greatest contribution to these efforts in the field of using space, it is essential to take urgent action to save its space potential, which is threatened with destruction. The third conclusion is that the position taken by the United States is of no less importance. If the position of political circles that strive for military hegemony and therefore seek to weaken Russia as much as possible and to bring about its unilateral disarmament, above all in the military-space field, are

to prevail, then it will of course be impossible to speak of any serious cooperation between the two states in this area. And without that cooperation, nothing can be done at all. Naturally, this also applies to the other nuclear powers—Britain, France, and China.

At the same time, if Russia and the United States were to undertake active cooperative efforts in the near future with the aim of preventing the threat of nuclear war, this could have a positive effect on both American public opinion and international public opinion as a whole. For this reason, the proposal of Academician N.N. Moiseyev and his colleagues that the leaders of Russia and the United States launch a joint initiative aimed at promoting global security—and, in the event the U.S. government were to decline, that the Russian Federation leadership launch such an initiative unilaterally—merits attention.

The end of the global ideological and military confrontation between the USSR (the CIS countries) and the United States makes it possible to pose the question of profound changes in the foundations on which we must build an international security system. A discussion of this issue goes beyond the bounds of the subject originally posed for discussion in the newspaper ZA RUBEZHOM. But it is now clear that it is within the context of this issue that we must work to solve the concrete problem of how to avert the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict once and for all.

Attempts by a single state to use national means to ensure its security, without regard for the security of all other states, can lead to a situation in which the security of that state is not enhanced but diminished. This circumstance lies at the heart of attempts to create collective international security systems.

A Global Information Initiative.

Increasing the amount of information available to the world community (for example, in the form of the UN) regarding the nuclear and chemical weapons that countries have and the military-economic potentials that they possess, and in general regarding any capability to exert a global effect and thereby influence the lives of all people, although it does not guarantee universal security, undoubtedly enhances that security. Within the structure of states' national interests, there thus arises, by virtue of the natural interrelationship between global and national security, a general trend toward openness, since a world in which all countries would know everything about each other is more secure than a world in which nothing or almost nothing is known. We would like to stress the circumstance that the effect of enhancing global security occurs only when states have a guarantee that no one can conceal anything.

This statement applies first and foremost to the United States and Russia. At the present time, one of the most important components of Russia's national security is the availability to the United States of reliable information about Russia's weapons—above all its nuclear arms—and about its military-economic potential, and

most importantly, the degree of United States confidence in the reliability of that information. Naturally, all this is valid on the condition that Russia possess similar data about the United States and has a similar confidence in its reliability.

The more the two countries are informed about each other's weapons and the more confidence they have in the reliability of that information, the more secure the world is. These circumstances, needless to say, are not grasped sufficiently clearly at the present time by many people (including many politicians).

An ever-greater contribution to global security is being made by the extent to which the world community is informed about the nuclear weapons of France, China, Israel, and South Africa, as well as about the state of the nuclear programs of Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and perhaps other countries. As time goes by, and as the apparently inevitable process of nuclear weapons proliferation and the buildup of the nuclear arsenals of those countries that already have them progresses, the importance of this contribution is going to grow.

It is clear that the security of the world community would be increased if it were possible to establish in it an order under which all states (above all the United States and Russia) would be obliged to provide the world community with complete information about their nuclear and chemical weapons and military-economic potential. We shall call the proposal to establish such a system a global information initiative.

Its establishment requires the introduction of corresponding legal norms in relations among countries. The foundation for this is sufficiently clear: If any state has the capability to exert any kind of influence on processes taking place on Earth, and thereby to influence the lives of all the people living on Earth, then these people (in the form of their corresponding states) should have the right to know what threatens them. And so the proposed legal norm is based on the following completely natural precept: Everything that can exert a global effect and influence the lives of all people should be known to all. A proposed legal norm can be formulated in the following categorical form: The concealing of information regarding the capability to exert a global effect, in particular the concealing of information about nuclear weapons, constitutes a crime against humanity.

We are not convinced that these provisions can at present be grasped by all politicians even in Russia and the United States. As for such states as Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan, they will undoubtedly try to create (or to obtain in some manner) nuclear weapons and to try to invariably keep secret everything associated with the existence and production of such weapons in their countries, totally ignoring the way such a policy affects global security. Such actions will be fully in keeping with the well-known axiom: The smaller and weaker a state, the less that global security means to it in comparison to national security.

A natural step that would make it possible to move significantly closer to a new world order would be a joint initiative by Russia and the United States aimed at providing the world community, in the form of the UN, with complete information about their nuclear and chemical weapons and military-economic potential, and in general about all their capabilities to exert a global effect, as well as an appeal by them to other countries to join a new information order. At present, as Russia and the United States significantly surpass all other states in terms of the quantity of strategic weapons, this action cannot diminish their national security. At the same time, it would substantially increase the level of global security, and through this the national security of both countries.

Verification From Space.

The act of providing the UN with complete information about nuclear and chemical weapons and about capabilities to exert any global effect, even if everyone has total confidence in the reliability of that information, will nevertheless have no effect on universal security unless there are means for objective verification. It is therefore essential to have means to carry out such objective monitoring and verification. Such means can be created within the framework of an international space-based information system (ISIS) under the UN aegis.

The existing space surveillance systems of the United States and Russia have equipment that could constitute the foundation of an ISIS. Thus the initial version of such a system could be created without sizable expenditures by integrating the space surveillance systems of Russia and the United States that are currently in operation. As it becomes increasingly impossible for the two countries to conceal anything from each other, the fact that the data gathered by these surveillance systems is classified by the two countries becomes increasingly absurd. The absurdity of this situation will only grow as countries now working to develop their own space surveillance systems—such as France, Italy, Spain, and others—acquire them. The conclusion arises that classifying the information gathered by surveillance systems serves not national interests, but the corporate interests of the intelligence services of the countries concerned.

An important circumstance is the fact that the possibility exists of combining the functions of an ISIS with the functions of a space subsystem of a global ecological monitoring system (SSGEMS) that is needed to ensure universal ecological security. Therefore, even though the ISIS and the SSGEMS are different systems, it nevertheless makes sense to design and develop them jointly, or at least in close contact with each other.

Let us discuss the question of international collective security policing systems (ICSPS). The need for such systems will be determined by the extent to which it becomes possible to ensure security through the proposed measures of an informational character. An ICSPS, should it nevertheless become necessary to

develop one, could be based on the system for global protection against limited strikes (GPALS), and its spaced-based echelon could be based on the so-called Brilliant Pebbles project that is now being developed by the United States and is designed to protect against terrorist, unauthorized, or accidental launches of ballistic missiles. This system, however, will enhance global security only when it acquires international status, when it is developed by an international consortium, and when it is deployed and operated under UN control. Of course, efforts in this area can be undertaken only after comprehensive expert analysis of such a project. At the present time, in our view, it is essential to put together an international group of scientists that could perform such an expert analysis.

Taken together, the ISIS, the SSGEMS, and the ICSPS could form an international space collective security system that would function under the aegis of the UN and its Security Council, provide these organizations with essential information, and also cut short any missile launch unauthorized by the world community. In developed form, it should include the following components, in our opinion:

- a) an information subsystem;
- b) an ecological monitoring subsystem;
- c) a policing subsystem;
- d) a space communications subsystem;
- e) a control subsystem;
- f) an analysis and information processing subsystem.

We propose that the leaders of Russia and the United States initiate efforts to implement the aspiration that all countries share to ensure global security. To do this, it is essential to provide the UN with complete information on all the capabilities without exception for exerting global effects that are possessed by Russia and the United States, and to propose that all other countries do likewise. We propose that Russia and the United States integrate their space surveillance systems into a single international space information system (the system could perhaps have commercial status) and develop it jointly under the UN aegis, while simultaneously charging it with the functions of an ecological monitoring system.

Should the United States decline to join in the proposed information initiative, we call on Russian President B.N. Yeltsin and the Russian government to launch this initiative unilaterally. This would require that it provide the UN with complete information on Russia's capabilities to exert global effects and to form on the basis of Russia's space surveillance systems an international consortium that would provide, on a commercial basis, the information it gathers to all states, organizations, and private individuals.

Postscript.

We would like to say a few words about the discussion of United States and Russian military space programs and the problems of possible cooperation by these countries

in using the achievements of space technology to ensure national and international security. This discussion is now under way in the Russian and foreign press and is exemplified by the discussion that has unfolded on the pages of the newspaper *ZA RUBEZHOM*. This fundamentally new approach to the problem of security is a result of the emergence of new realities in international relations. The questions of what to do with costly space programs, how to reorient them in keeping with world development trends, are they needed to ensure national security amid the new conditions, and how to preserve and utilize the technical and intellectual potential amassed in this field are very timely for both Russia and the United States.

B.N. Yeltsin's proposals for developing a Russian-American space shield have prompted a sharp debate in our press. The authors of virtually all articles agree that implementing a new project under the SDI-GPALS program that would be designed to prevent limited missile strikes would be in conflict with the ABM Treaty and would be of a destabilizing character. They put special emphasis on the danger of placing offensive components of a new missile defense system in space and on the incompatibility of these plans with international agreements. On the other hand, all agree that an alternative to the GPALS program would be an international space security monitoring program that would use Russian and American space technology. However, the American side has yet to respond to proposals for taking steps in this area.

It must be pointed out that within the United States itself, the SDI program in its new form is being sharply criticized from the most diverse positions. This criticism has become especially intense recently and is being used in the presidential election campaigns. U.S. scientific circles are aware of the potential negative consequences of carrying out the SDI program (as well as its shortcomings) and are urging cooperation with Russia and other countries. It is believed that broad discussion at the international level of the problems of using space amid the new geopolitical conditions should ultimately lead to the formulation of a mutually acceptable concept on whose basis international cooperation could be organized.

In general, the articles in our press, and above all in *ZA RUBEZHOM*, have outlined a realistic range of problems in the field of using space and have reflected existing views of this problem. At the same time, we cannot find, unfortunately, any constructive ideas here that could be carried out in international projects. The participation of third countries, the UN, and other international organizations in establishing cooperation in this field has hardly been discussed.

Unfortunately, nor has there been any discussion of the extremely important, in our opinion, question of the international legal status of a space global security monitoring system, and of related problems.

Likewise, to our great regret, we cannot find in the articles published in our press any constructive proposals for saving the Russian missile and space industry, including proposals based on international cooperation.

Will A First Step Be Taken?

At the upcoming summit meeting in the United States, George Bush intends to propose to Boris Yeltsin that Russia take part in an international global missile defense system, the weekly *AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY* reports.

"The Bush Administration hopes that in putting forward a concrete proposal for cooperation in the field of strategic defense, it will be able to break the deadlock in its attempt to modify the treaty limiting antimissile defense systems," the magazine points out. The U.S. administration's proposals call for the development of a system for exchanging early warning data, providing assistance to the agreement's member countries in modernizing or acquiring antimissile defense systems, and cooperating in the use of a missile defense system.

Besides Russia, the administration intends to discuss the proposals for participation in an antimissile defense system with Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the other former Soviet republics, as well as with the United States's closest allies.

It is quite possible the greatest doubts about a joint global defense will be expressed by the United States's leading allies. They fear that an "antimissile umbrella" over our planet will significantly devalue their comparatively modest nuclear deterrent forces. In this regard, *AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY* reports, Washington is trying to assure Paris and London that the proposed global missile defense system will be able to protect only against a limited nuclear strike.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

Lithuanian Officials: USSR Troop Numbers 'Understated'

*LD2406205892 Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS
in Lithuanian 12 Jun 92 p 1 LD*

[Unattributed article: "How many former USSR troops are there in Lithuania?"]

[Excerpts] At the beginning of this year the headquarters of the Northwestern army group informed the Ministry of National Defense that there were 34,000 warrant officers and soldiers and 582 officers. This number, in the opinion of ministry officials, is greatly understated, but there is no possibility of verifying that.

On 2 March 103 soldiers left Mickunai and Visorai in military vehicles. This was, as it were, the beginning of the troops withdrawal. [passage omitted]

In the first three months of this year only 253 servicemen were withdrawn. At this rate the last soldier would leave Lithuania only after 30 years!

As the referendum, and especially Yeltsin's visit to Washington, were approaching, this rate "increased". A paratroop training center was removed from Rukla settlement in Jonava rayon, and some tanks, armored vehicles, and some ammunition left Pabrade. Students of the higher radio electronic school should leave Vilnius at the end of the academic year. And that is all.

Meanwhile, some 1,000 recruits have been brought in to the airborne training units deployed in Kazlu Ruda. Thus, the size of the Russian army is the same as before. Strong military garrisons are deployed in all of Lithuania's larger towns.

Where is the former USSR army deployed in Lithuania?—Vilnius, the 107th Motorized Rifle Division; Kaunas, the 7th Airborne Division; Klaipeda, the Coastal Defense Division, or former 3d Motorized Rifle Division—in 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev, "fulfilling" his promise to the Americans to reduce the land army, dressed infantrymen in the uniform of seamen; Siauliai, the air force regiment with the largest military airfield; Panevezys, the headquarters of the air force transport division, planes, and the airfield services; Alytus, a regiment of the 7th Airborne Division; Marijampole, another regiment of the 7th Division; Kedainiai, an air force transportation unit; Ukmurge, two regiments of the 107th Motorized Rifle Division; Plunge, part of a heavy artillery brigade.

These are the garrisons only in the larger Lithuanian towns. Their units are dispersed in nearly 180 military cantonments, often in the most beautiful places of the republic to which Lithuanian citizens have no access. These places occupy an area of 68,000 hectares. [passage omitted—demands for compensation of damage inflicted by army will be presented to Russia]

Russian-German Body Discusses Troop Withdrawal

LD1906082792 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1804 GMT 16 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Korniyenko]

[Text] Berlin, 16 Jun—A routine session of the mixed commission on the withdrawal of the troops of the Western Group of Forces from Germany was held here today under the chairmanship of Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces. The Russian representatives noted that as of 1 June 78,000 people—including 49,700 servicemen—18,000 items of various types of hardware and weaponry, and 315,000 tonnes of material and technical

equipment—including 110,000 tonnes of ammunition—had been withdrawn from German territory in 1992; 54 military installations were handed over to the German side.

Reference was made to the social problems facing servicemen in the Western Group of Forces as they return home, the solution to which requires the faster and more efficient sale of buildings and the implementation of the plan for building houses program at the new places of deployment.

The sides discussed the range of issues connected with the Western Group of Forces' intention to carry out the destruction of the armored combat vehicles on German territory where they are based for those vehicles which are to be cut under the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe. The sides confirmed their intention to reach an agreement swiftly in order to create all the preconditions for the destruction of the armored vehicles in the shortest period of time.

The commission welcomed the progress being made on preventing damage to the environment. The delegation reported on measures being taken to clean up the areas occupied by the troops.

The successful cooperation between the Western Group of Forces' law enforcement bodies and the German authorities in preventing and pursuing criminal acts was noted.

The commission also noted the efforts of German charitable organizations and private individuals in helping child victims of the Chernobyl disaster who are being treated in the Western Group of Forces' hospital in Beelitz.

Army Troops Withdraw 'Joylessly' From Poland

LD2206105292 Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network
in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Jun 92

[Video report by Yu. Ulyanov from Poland on Russian troop withdrawal; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Russian troops are withdrawing from Poland. They are withdrawing joylessly, because there is no housing in their homeland. But they are withdrawing in accordance with the treaty and schedule given to the Polish side without concealing anything.

Leonid Kovalev, the new commander of the Western Group of Forces, spoke honestly about all our problems to representatives of the Polish Army and the military attaches of all embassies in Warsaw at a Russian troop unit location.

There are no tanks, rocket launchers, or artillery systems in Poland. Only two communications brigades will remain after 15 November, the final time limit for the withdrawal of our troops, to guarantee the withdrawal

and transit through Polish territory of the Western Group of Forces leaving Germany.

Troop Pullout From Baltics Discussed at CSCE in Helsinki

Lithuanian Envoy Comments

*LD2206195392 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 22 Jun 92*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Troop withdrawals will be discussed in Helsinki 9-10 July, where a meeting of the heads of state and government 52 European countries, Canada, and the United States will take place.

Ambassador Valdemaras Katkus, head of the Lithuanian delegation to the CSCE, returned last night from Helsinki, where preparations for the summit-level CSCE meeting are nearly completed.

[Begin Katkus recording] One must recall that there has been an 18-member increase in just two years; some new ones have appeared in the European Community and new problems have also increased in an equal proportion.

One of them, the one most urgent for the Lithuanian people is that of the Russian Army, which continues to be stationed in Lithuania and in the other Baltic States and which is presenting a great threat to our security. Moreover, this question—especially in the aftermath of the referendum—was precisely what our delegation had to present this week, and to explain this result widely and thoroughly and to explain its practical consequences on Russian [words indistinct] illegally present on Lithuanian territory.

We have prepared several clauses based on the referendum which should be [words indistinct] added to the final document, concerning the fact that an agreement should be drawn up, without delay, on the withdrawal from Lithuania and that the schedule of withdrawal will be presented from the Lithuanian side and that it must be unconditionally carried out by the Russian side.

This work is not so simple. The support of 52 states must be obtained, and this must be approved by the so-called consensus method. However, there is one good thing about it, namely, that the referendum results in Lithuania leave no room for the Russian delegation's speculations, that the army's withdrawal is desired only by certain politicians or else, let's say, by the Supreme Council chairman alone, or some faction or another. Thus, it is very important that this constitutes serious support and a serious legal argument, an argument expressing the people's will, which currently, is especially helpful to our work.

However, as I noted before, the work continues all the way up to 9 and 10 July and preparations are now being finalized or, more precisely, concerning the final text—what sort of political declaration it must be, which is

called Helsinki Two, that is, from 1975 an assessment [words indistinct] new future in Europe and we think that it should [words indistinct] on Lithuanian territory.

Comments Further

*OW2406134392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1312 GMT 24 Jun 92*

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuania will insist on including the removal of the former Union troops, now under Russia's jurisdiction, in the final document of the Helsinki-2 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, said Valdemaras Katkus, head of the Lithuanian delegation to the CSCE's conference scheduled for July 9-10.

He believes that the schedule of withdrawal should be proposed by Lithuania and that Russia should strictly observe it.

On the eve of the Helsinki-2 conference Russia is planning to make steps to neutralize the hysteria over the Russian troops in the Baltic states, said a Russian diplomat specializing in relations with the Baltic states.

He told DP ["Diplomatic Panorama"] that the statement made by Valdemaras Katkus is one of many statements fanning tensions on the eve of the Helsinki conference.

He said, however, that the Russian Foreign Ministry does not intend to respond to this particular statement in any way.

He confirmed Russia's firm conviction that all problems pertaining to the Russian troops' stay in Lithuania and to the definition of their status and schedule of withdrawal be tackled through bilateral talks.

Russian Official Hits Lithuanian Stance

*OW2406162192 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1604 GMT 24 Jun 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] In anticipation of Helsinki-2 conference (July 9-10), Russia is planning to take measures aimed at "neutralizing the hysteria surrounding the issue of the Russian troops withdrawal from the Baltic countries", said an employee of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an interview to BALTFAX, requesting, however, that his identity remain unidentified.

The Russian diplomat made a special emphasis of the recent pronouncements by Mr. Katkus, head of the Lithuanian delegation at the CSCE conference in Helsinki, averring that "the statements such as that can only further strain the situation on the eve of the Helsinki meeting".

In his Monday [22 June] appearance on the republican television, Mr. Katkus asserted that Lithuania would insist that a resolution on the former USSR troops withdrawal from the Baltic countries be included in the text of the Final Document of the Helsinki-2 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Mr. Katkus also stressed that the withdrawal timetable for the Russian troops ought to be devised and put forth by Lithuania while Russia would have to pledge to "unconditionally" abide by it.

The unidentified employee of the Russian foreign ministry also indicated that Russia has no intentions to take any diplomatic action, such as a note, nor even react to "this particular statement".

The Russian diplomat reiterated that Russia's stance in this regard remains unchanging, meaning that "all the issues associated with the stationing of the Russian troops on the territory of Lithuania, their status, and the timetable of their withdrawal should be resolved only in the process of the countries' bilateral talks".

Estonian Council Chairman Speaks

*LD0907171392 Tallinn Radio Estonia in English
1520 GMT 9 Jul 92*

[Text] The hottest issue in the whole world right now is the CSCE summit held in Helsinki. The chairman of the Estonian Supreme Council, Arnold Ruutel, delivered a speech at the summit today.

Estonia, after joining CSCE, has placed great hopes on the organization in the issue of foreign troop withdrawal, but the hopes have not been fulfilled so far, said Chairman of the Estonian Supreme Council Arnold Ruutel in his address before the summit of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe today.

Mr. Ruutel said that practically no progress has been made in talks with Russia over the withdrawal of ex-Soviet Army troops. Foreign troops are staying in the Baltics in contradiction to the standards of international law, and without consent of the Baltic states.

The chairman of the Estonian Supreme Council also said that the issue of troop withdrawal from the Baltics is not a problem of bilateral relations between Estonia and Russia, as the presence of foreign troops in the Baltic region also jeopardizes the security of north European countries.

European countries should think against whom these troops are directed, Mr. Ruutel pointed out. According to Mr. Ruutel, a number of statements concerning the Baltic states had been made in the last 24 hours. Some of them give hope that a solution has been achieved in the main issue.

Mr. Ruutel in his address also said that Europe needs a comprehensive framework for prevention of conflicts and ensuring of international security. He called on European countries not to (?save means) for setting up

international security forces. In Mr. Ruutel's words, the Baltic countries in the distribution of international aid sometimes have remained in the shadow of East European countries and members of the CIS. The amount of foreign investments in the Baltics had proved smaller than earlier expected, first of all due to political instability created by foreign army troops.

Baltic Council Appeal Issued on Troop Withdrawal

*LD2706174292 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network
in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 27 Jun 92*

[Appeal by the Baltic Council to G-7 leaders adopted at the Council's session in Tallinn on 26 June]

[Text] The Baltic Council is compelled to state that the armed forces of the foreign state—the Russian Federation—have not withdrawn from the territories of the independent states of the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, and the Republic of Lithuania. This goes against the will of the peoples and is in disregard to government demands. They not only constitute a danger to the Baltic countries' security, but also are a factor in destabilizing all of Europe, undermining the trust in justice and in the universally acknowledged principles of international law, particularly the principles of sovereign states' peaceful coexistence.

The Russian Army continues to harm the Baltic countries ecologically and economically.

The Baltic Council stresses that the Russian Armed Forces have no juridical grounds to remain in the Baltic states. Unfortunately, it must be stressed that the progress of negotiations between the Baltic states and Russia on the withdrawal of the armed forces demonstrates the Russian Federation's attempts to retain and legally consolidate the stay of its Army in the Baltic states.

Bearing all this in mind, the Baltic Council appeals to the heads of the states and governments of Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States, Canada, France, and Germany to help in every way possible to get the Russian Armed Forces out of the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Estonia, and the Republic of Latvia.

Regarding aid to Russia, the Baltic Council proposes that special funds be allocated to finance the Russian Army's withdrawal from the territories of the sovereign Baltic states.

The Baltic Council appeals to the heads of the above-mentioned states and their governments to make economic aid to Russia directly dependent on the plan and graphs of the Army's withdrawal from Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia submitted by the Russian Federation and coordinated with the Baltic states and on real steps toward unconditionally withdrawing the entire Army.

Landsbergis Interviewed on Troop Withdrawal

*AU3006082192 Vienna ORF Television Network
in German 2000 GMT 29 Jun 92*

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, president of the Lithuanian Parliament, by Susanne Scholl; place and date not given—recorded; Landsbergis statements in Russian with superimposed German translation]

[Text] [Scholl] You must now ensure that the referendum, which called for the immediate withdrawal of the Army, shows the expected results.

[Landsbergis] The referendum was only partly directed at Russia. It puts an obligation on Russia to withdraw its Army. The referendum was also directed at the Western democracies. If the Western nations fail to support Lithuania then they fail to support not only the Lithuanian parliament and government but the entire people, because the referendum showed that everybody wants the Army out.

[Scholl] Do you have the feeling that the current Russian Army in Lithuania continues to pose a danger?

[Landsbergis] The dangers lie in Russia itself, not only for us but for everybody else, too. If changes take place in Russia and if aggressive forces gain influence, the danger would become apparent. If the Russian Army were to plan an attack against Lithuania it would not have to cross the border, because it is already here—10 minutes away from the parliament.

[Scholl] Would you say that Lithuania is sufficiently supported by the West?

[Landsbergis] Western aid has so far been insufficient to stabilize the situation and to effectively rule out a political relapse. This is not only true for all post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, but even Russia itself is only inadequately supported. However, Lithuania is much smaller and could be helped much more easily than Russia.

Foreign Minister: Byelarus To Sign CFE Treaty

*LD3006191992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1909 GMT 30 Jun 92*

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent Tatyana Khryapina]

[Text] Minsk June 30 TASS—Byelarus is ready to join the treaty on conventional arms cuts in Europe, Byelarusian Foreign Minister Peter Kravchenko said on Tuesday [30 June].

Kravchenko expressed confidence that the Byelarusian parliament will ratify the treaty this autumn.

He stressed Byelarus aims to become a nuclear-free and neutral state. It has already withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory and is now beginning

to dismantle strategic nuclear arms. The republic plans to complete the withdrawal in seven years, Kravchenko said.

Ministry Notes Withdrawal Figures for Latvia

*LD0407065792 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1730 GMT 3 Jul 92*

[Text] Of the approximately 50,000 Russian soldiers in Latvia, only 1,600 are to be withdrawn by the end of this year. That was the government viewpoint stated at a news conference today by Viktor Shikalov, representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Latvian Radio has already reported that the talks between Latvia and Russia on the withdrawal of troops concluded without a successful solution to the problem.

NATO Training for CFE Inspectors Noted

*92P50125A Moscow ROSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Jul 92 p 4*

[I.M. item: "Visual Aids for Inspectors"]

[Text] So that they can observe the destruction of Soviet military equipment in a competent manner, 120 inspectors from the 16 NATO member countries have gone to "lessons" in Belgium, where an exhibition of Soviet-made military equipment has been set up. The main task is to teach an inspector how to determine the point at which combat equipment becomes entirely safe. MiG-23 and MiG-21 warplanes, T-72 and T-55 tanks, Mi-8 helicopters, and BMP-1 vehicles are serving as visual aids. All of the "educational materials" were supplied by the FRG, which received them as an inheritance from the former GDR.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT**CD Chief Delegate Summarizes Session Results**

*LD2906142192 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1645 GMT 26 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Geneva, 26 Jun—The second phase of the annual Conference on Disarmament [CD] session ended today. The participants concentrated on how to attain the principal goal of this body—the drafting of a multilateral convention banning the production, storage, and use of chemical weapons. Summing up this latest stage of the session, Sergey Batsanov, head of the Russian delegation at the CD, said in an interview with ITAR-TASS:

"As we know, the presidents of Russia and the United States have called upon the participants in the talks to complete by August the drafting of a document which will ensure the global destruction of chemical weapons. The opportunity to do this does exist, but it will require exceptional effort. The outcome of such effort applied during the current phase of the session is a new draft

convention presented by Richter von Wagner, chairman of the UN's special committee on chemical weapons. It reflects agreements already reached and proposes new compromise solutions. How acceptable these solutions are and how far the text has managed to observe the balance of interests will become clear during the next round of talks, due to start on 20 July. In any event, not everything in the text is to Russia's liking, which is why there will be some very hard work when the delegations next get together."

The head of the Russian delegation continued: "As far as other issues are concerned, discussions on them proceeded more smoothly than ever before. I cannot think of anything that is worth singling out. There were debates on averting an arms race in space and on nuclear disarmament. But all this, unfortunately, is far removed from the purposeful work to draft a convention on chemical weapons. The situation is now forcing many people to think hard and to unofficially debate the future of the CD after a chemical weapons convention has been concluded. Leaving chemical weapons aside, this forum has lost its identity. It is absolutely clear that the conference needs thorough reform so that it can meet today's requirements, both in its agenda and in the way it works. I think that by early next year our main problem will be how to overhaul the conference."

NUCLEAR TESTING

Further on Fate of Semipalatinsk Test Site

Cabinet Decrees Further Measures

*LD2306191992 Alma-Ata Kazakh Radio Network
in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jun 92*

[Text] In order to eliminate the consequences of nuclear explosions, the Cabinet of Ministers has made a decision on additional measures to implement the president's decree on the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test range.

It has been decided to resolve within two months questions on the declassification of materials concerning the radio-ecological and medical-biological situation on the territory of the former test range and other regions in the republic where tests were held of nuclear or thermonuclear weapons. Information will also be declassified on the consequences of the effects of the tests on people, animals, and the environment.

The following have been declared ecological disaster zones: all rayons of Semipalatinsk Oblast; the towns of Semipalatinsk and Kurchatov; Glubokovskiy, Zaysanskiy, Tavricheskiy, Tarbagatayskiy, Ulanskiy, and Shelemonaikinskiy rayons and the town of Ust-Kamenogorsk in East Kazakhstan Oblast; Yegindybulaikskiy and Karkaralinskiy rayons of Karaganda Oblast; and Bayanaulskiy, Lebyazhinskiy, and Mayskiy rayons of Pavlodar Oblast.

The status of territories which have suffered and of citizens having the right to receive benefits and compensation for the damage caused to their health as a result of the tests will be determined.

It is envisaged to draw up a draft law on the social protection of those who have suffered from nuclear tests at the Semipalatinsk test range and other nuclear explosions carried out on the republic's territory.

The decision outlines a number of measures for cleaning up the negative consequences of the nuclear tests and envisages bringing in under mutually advantageous conditions investments and advanced technologies of foreign states.

The document will be published in full in the republican press.

Site Becomes Kazakh National Nuclear Center

*LD2306130392 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1200 gmt 23 Jun 92*

[Text] The Semipalatinsk nuclear testing range has been reorganized into the national nuclear center of Kazakhstan. Its employees will be engaged in developing nuclear safety measures and technologies for burial of nuclear waste. They will also be involved in Kazakhstan's program to build a network of nuclear power stations. Three experimental nuclear reactors and equipment for work with fissile materials are now at the disposal of scientists, RIKA reports.

'Perennial Effects' of Semipalatinsk Studied

Committee Set Up in Altay Kray

*LD2806164692 Moscow Mayak Radio Network
in Russian 1530 GMT 28 Jun 92*

[Text] A committee for eliminating the aftermath of the perennial effects of nuclear explosions in the Semipalatinsk test ground has been set up in the administration of the Altay Kray. The committee is to coordinate the activity of all scientific establishments and also practical research into the study of the medical-ecological situation which has taken shape in the kray in connection with the fact that for many years the kray experienced the effects of nuclear explosions.

Immune Systems Damaged

*LD2906195592 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0632 GMT 26 Jun 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valentin Pavlov]

[Text] Barnaul, 26 June—Immunologists from the Institute of Biophysics of the Siberian Section of the Russian Academy of Sciences have discovered indications of the effect of radiation on the inhabitants of Altay (West Siberia) living near the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. Studies carried out in Loktevskiy, Rubtsovskiy and Uglovskiy rayons have shown that the years have not

erased the consequences of the nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk, the ALTAYSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper reported today.

Mikhail Koroteyev and Konstantin Pukhov, scientists from the Institute of Biophysics, have created a unique piece of equipment controlled by a personal computer with a special program. A blood sample is taken from the patient and ninety minutes later one can see on the screen a graph of the genetics of the development of the cells. Scientists took neighboring Krasnoyarskiy region as the control sample; it has excellent geochemical environmental data.

Yana Pukhova, doctor of biology and head of the research group, said studies in the Rubtsovsk zone of Altay Kray give cause for concern. "The immune system of patients here cries out for help; anomalous phenomena have been discovered. This applies to adults who have been subjected to the influence of small doses of radiation over a long period and also to children," Pukhova noted.

After carrying out further analyses, scientists from the Institute of Biophysics will give their conclusions and recommendations which will serve as the basis for working out practical measures to help the region's population.

Environmental Harm From Secret Nuclear Tests in Yakutia

92WN0666A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 27, 5-12 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Nikolayev, president of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia): "Yakutia's Own Chernobyl"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In the '70-80s dozens of nuclear explosions were carried out in secret in the Vilyui area. Environmental stress has shown a heavy toll on local people ever since. They are disheartened because they don't see how the land's problems can be solved, and because of the irresponsible behaviour of industry.

However, there's been a certain change for the better: something is already being done to improve the natural environment. Nearly 40,000,000 roubles were invested in nature conservation in the Vilyui area last year alone. Since 1991 all projects have been screened for ecological harmlessness.

The Supreme Soviet has announced the territory nuclear free. This means a ban on nuclear tests, the use and storage of nuclear charges and waste, and the construction of nuclear power plants. However, the local population—aware of nuclear tests in the past—demand public medical and ecological checks. Not long ago our government passed a special decision to make up for what was virtually enforced resettlement of part of the population as a result of environmental damage. We are

pressing organizations operating here to change their attitude towards the northern environment. [passage omitted]

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Russo-German Discussions on CW Ban

LD3006124492 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1012 GMT 30 Jun 92

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Text] Moscow June 30 TASS—Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedayev received on Monday [29 June] German Ambassador Klaus Blech at the latter's request, ITAR-TASS learned from the Russian Foreign Ministry on Tuesday. The ambassador handed over a personal message from German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev about the conclusion in Geneva of the work on the draft convention on comprehensive ban of chemical weapons [CW]. There was an exchange of opinions on problems of chemical disarmament, stepping up of all-round Russo-German cooperation, prospects for the development of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russo-Ukrainian relations. Other problems were also discussed.

Russian Decree on CBW Treaty Obligations Approved

924C1889Z Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jul 92 p 1

[Article by Robert Minasov: "Whatever the Question—There Is a Discussion"]

[Excerpt] ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA parliamentary commentators report from the White House.

At the daytime session on 8 July the Supreme Soviet examined the draft decree "On Ensuring Fulfillment of International Obligations in the Realm of Chemical and Biological Weapons," presented by the president. Reporting on it in a speech was Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Industry and Power Engineering Vitaliy Vitebskiy.

The decree was approved. [passage omitted]

NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES & PEACE ZONES

Ukrainian President on Black Sea NFZ Initiative

OW2606182192 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1655 GMT 26 Jun 92

[transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] "The Declaration on Black Sea regional economic cooperation signed in Istanbul means that for the

first time in history the Black Sea nations have obtained a unique chance to set really equal conditions for economic and political interaction"—our correspondent has been told by President Leonid Kravchuk who stressed that the interests of all states in the area can now be met. [passage omitted]

Leonid Kravchuk further described the Istanbul declaration as an important step towards implementing the peaceful principles of the CSCE. He pointed out Ukraine's initiative to turn the Black Sea area into a nuclear weapons-free zone [NFZ] as a proposal worthy of its neighbours' support. "We can turn the Black Sea into a zone of peace, stability, and prosperity", he stressed. [passage omitted]

REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

Byelarus Foreign Minister on Tactical, Strategic Arms

LD0107131492 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 1 Jul 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Byelarus intends to sign a treaty on reducing conventional weapons. Petr Kravchenko, the foreign minister of the republic, has said that his country intends to scrap all nuclear weapons. Tactical weapons have already been withdrawn from Byelarus. As for strategic weapons, they will be dismantled in the next seven years.

Byelarus Defense Minister Questions Withdrawal Timetable

OW0107201392 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1900 GMT 1 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Deputy Defense Minister of Byelarus Colonel General Petr Chaus questions the need to set a definite time period for the withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons from the republic and "considering the touchy political situation in the world" questions the need to withdraw them "in the near future". In an interview with "IF" [INTERFAX] Chaus said: "There aren't any nations in the world who wouldn't like to have nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary, they are all trying to get them".

CIS Defense Ministers Meet in Moscow

Fail To Agree on Ukraine Forces

LD0307153692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1523 GMT 3 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow, July 3 TASS—CIS foreign and defence ministers, who met here today on the eve of the CIS summit, failed to agree on the status of strategic forces on the territory of Ukraine.

Kiev would like to maintain control over troops deployed in Ukraine, including strategic forces. This problem will be left to the discretion of the heads of state, due to meet in Moscow on July 6.

Describing his country's stand on this problem, Byelarusian Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanko said: "We cannot remain indifferent to the Russian-Ukrainian dialogue, because this problem affects nuclear security of the whole region." Minsk regards nuclear weapons on its territory as the weapons belonging to another country, and its main concern is that they should not be used.

Shaposhnikov, Deputy Cited

OW0307170292 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1540 GMT 3 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Council of Defense Minister of Commonwealth nations Friday [3 July] was unable to come to an agreement on the day's most important issue—who will control the strategic forces stationed in the four nuclear states, the acting first deputy of the Commonwealth United Armed Forces Colonel General Boris Pyankov said in an interview with "IF" [INTERFAX]. Pyankov noted that almost all other matters were decided. The remaining issues will be discussed Saturday morning.

Explaining the situation of strategic weapons, Pyankov said that the representative from Kiev stated the Ukraine would like to maintain control of nuclear potential on its territory, officially declaring itself a non-nuclear state.

The Byelarusian and Kazakh defense ministers argued that all nuclear weapons should be controlled by Russia.

The General said that in light of Ukraine's position General Yuriy Maksimov, commander of the missile units of the UAF [Unified Armed Forces], said that if Ukraine insists on this he will be forced to deny responsibility for nuclear security.

The Commander of the UAF Yevgeny Shaposhnikov "said that if Ukraine does not want to be a nuclear state it should remove the nuclear warheads from missiles and in 5-7 years dismantle them". Neither of these versions suited the Ukrainian delegation, Pyankov said.

Shaposhnikov told "IF" that he predicted this result of discussions on the status of strategic forces would be fruitless. He added that the defense ministers decided to continue discussions Friday and will continue "until we succeed".

Shaposhnikov Rejects Ukrainian Claims

LD0307100692 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0934 GMT 3 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, July 3 (TASS)—“I believe Ukraine should better say that it is a nuclear state, CIS Commander-in-Chief Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov said on Friday [3 July] commenting on Ukrainian programme for strategic forces which was brought to the meeting of CIS defence ministers in Moscow.

Ukraine insists on its right for administrative management of strategic forces deployed on its territory while the CIS armed forces command will be in charge of combat management of the forces,” Shaposhnikov said.

Thus, Ukraine strives to independently manage a whole number of issues connected with supplies, staffing of the strategic forces, promoting officers to new ranks, he added.

Such a stand is not accepted in full by Kazakhstan, Byelarus and Russia, Shaposhnikov stated.

However, another disputed issue, that of the Black Sea Fleet seems to be mostly resolved. Shaposhnikov welcomed the Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the fleet reached in Dagomys.

But the fleet cannot be subordinated to the CIS command in its present form, as it is not a state and does not have even a flag.

Strategic forces should be split from the fleet, “any state flag can be hoisted over them and only then can they be transferred under the command of the CIS armed forces,” Shaposhnikov proposed. “I believe the formula is most acceptable,” he added.

Apart from six agreements and provisions which the CIS defence ministers plan to submit to the Commonwealth summit on July 6, the ministers will also discuss during their two-day meeting in Moscow such issues as the composition of the CIS strategic forces, the basic principles of the military doctrine and nuclear strategy, international cooperation in the use of airspace, provision of information for the CIS armed forces and plans of defence ministers' council for the coming three months.

Shaposhnikov: Ukraine Would Be Nuclear Power

LD0307225292 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Jul 92

[Excerpt] A routine session of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers has been held in Moscow. Representatives of all the countries, except Moldova, took part. Differences in the positions of the delegations on the matters under discussion were quite substantial. Here is our correspondent Yevgeniy Zherebenkov.

[Zherebenkov] The command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces has so far failed to eliminate its differences with Ukraine on the status and manner of commanding the strategic forces deployed on Ukrainian territory. Trilateral talks held on Thursday [2 July] evening between the heads of the military departments of Russia and Ukraine and the main command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces ended with a compromise at the expert level. The sides agreed to put these forces under dual control—the main command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. Certain points of agreement in the positions of the sides have been found. But it seems they do not satisfy Marshal Shaposhnikov very much.

[Begin Shaposhnikov recording] If all the points put forward by Ukraine are accepted by our side, we would be agreeing that Ukraine can be a nuclear power. They say they will be in our operational command [operativnoye komandovaniye] but under their operational subordination [operativnoye podchineniye]. Operational subordination means a Ukrainian oath, Ukrainian personnel policy and appointments, and Ukrainian upkeep. It would mean that I would be commanding Ukrainian servicemen. I do not want that. So I want to be clear and precise on this. Either it is my serviceman, subordinate to me, or a Ukrainian serviceman. If he is Ukrainian, let Ukraine announce that it is a nuclear power and let the world community discuss this with it. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Views Division of Power

OW0307104392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0959 GMT 3 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Forces Marshall Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov declared on the necessity to develop a mechanism for dividing the powers between the Main Committee of the CIS Joint Forces and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. In particular, it concerns the nuclear forces stationed on the Ukrainian territory, he said during a conversation with “IF” [INTERFAX] before the session of the CIS Defense Ministers’ Council in Moscow.

Shaposhnikov noted that the current position of Kiev in respect to this question may cause a misunderstanding on the part of Kazakhstan, Byelarus, and Russia. According to Shaposhnikov, if the problem is not solved then “Ukraine must announce that it will be a nuclear power and to solve this issue at the level of the international community”.

Meanwhile the first deputy of the Ukrainian defense minister General Ivan Pizza told “IF” that during his meeting with Marshall Shaposhnikov on the eve of the session of the CIS Defense Ministers’ Council on July 3 they discussed a draft agreement on the strategic nuclear forces stationed on the Ukrainian territory. The document also defines the state legal status of the servicemen of the strategic forces on the Ukrainian territory.

Pizza was satisfied with the outcome of the meeting "as we managed to find a compromise satisfying both parties". "We agree that there must be a united control over the nuclear weapons", he noted.

Issue Removed From CIS Summit Agenda

*OW0607162492 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1558 GMT 6 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] "IF" [INTERFAX] learned that the issue of the make-up of the Commonwealth strategic forces, as it was presented to the Commonwealth summit in progress in Moscow, was removed from the agenda as an acceptable variant was not agreed upon. Instead, a proposal by the Commander of the Commonwealth UAF [Unified Armed Forces] Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov was accepted; thus the issue will be discussed by the heads of the four nuclear states - Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

"We will observe the conditions outlined by the START-2 treaty" (on the reduction of strategic weapons - IF), Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov said in an interview with "IF" correspondent Marina Chernukha. Morozov said that Ukraine is willing to remove nuclear warheads from its missiles, but "this will be accomplished according to agreements over a period of seven years". Morozov said administrative subordination of Commonwealth forces stationed in Ukraine will ensure the legal protection of servicemen. "Servicemen who have pledged loyalty to Ukraine must be allowed to consider themselves citizens of the republic who are protected under the law. [quotation mark as received] Administrative subordination, in Morozov's opinion, "encompasses the breadth of the problem".

The commander of the Commonwealth forces has not changed his position, the First Deputy Commander of the UAF Colonel General Boris Paykov, confirmed to the post Monday, said in an interview with "IF". "If Ukraine wants to call itself a non-nuclear state it must remove nuclear warheads from its missiles and dismantle them within 7 years; otherwise the commander of the UAF is unable to guarantee that the weapons will not be used", Pyankov said.

Ukrainian Official Distrusts Shaposhnikov's Promises

*OW0607210392 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1833 GMT 6 Jul 92*

[Transmitted via KYODO; quotation marks as received]

[Text] Ukraine insists on keeping nuclear warheads in assembly with the delivery vehicles deployed on its territory, largely because it has no confidence in Marshal Shaposhnikov's statements", the Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Buzhan has told IF [INTERFAX]. "We have been offered to replace those warheads with non-nuclear equivalents", Buzhan said. "However it is quite clear that there are not enough equivalents for all missiles. Without them the delivery vehicles may become dangerous.

Ivan Buzhan explained his doubts by the fact that six months ago in Alma-Ata the Council of the Heads of State and government asked the CIS Commander-in-Chief Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to provide the Ukrainian President with the technical means to block the use of nuclear arms. "Shaposhnikov said he would do that, but has failed to do anything to this date", Buzhan said. Moreover, he claims that this is impossible. For that reason we want a comprehensive and consistent settlement of the problem, the more so since this does not disagree with the START-2 treaty.

Asked about what made Ukraine change its position after it had already announced it was going to remove all nuclear arms from its territory by 1994, Ivan Buzhan said: "Our experts have studied the technical aspects of the problem and found that it cannot be done sooner than seven years".

About another proposal from the CIS allied command for cancelling the targeting of the missiles Ivan Buzhan said it was none of Ukraine's problem, but if that could be done, Ukraine would have nothing against.

CIS General Staff: Ukraine Violates Lisbon Protocol

*LD0707050992 Moscow Radio Rossii Network
in Russian 0300 GMT 7 Jul 92*

[Text] Ukraine's nuclear status remains unclear for the time being. Ukraine's Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov maintains that the republic adheres to non-nuclear principles. The NEGA News Agency reports, however, that the General Staff of the CIS troops believes that Ukraine is violating the Lisbon protocol. Having signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a nuclear-free state, the republic announced its administrative control over the strategic arms stationed on Ukrainian territory. In the general staff's view, this means that Ukraine will be a nuclear proprietor for seven years. After discussing this problem at the Moscow summit, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to start talks on implementing the Lisbon accord.

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